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COMMENTARIES
FEDERAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM BASED ON
VIRGINIA ELECTION LAW: THE CARSON ACT AS A
SIMPLE, EFFECTIVE, AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANS
TO CURB CORRUPTION IN THE FINANCING OF
FEDERAL CAMPAIGNS
Rhodes Beahm Ritenour *
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Congress has recognized that actual and ap-
parent corruption exists in the federal campaign finance system
and has passed campaign finance reform legislation in an at-
tempt to curb that corruption.1 The Supreme Court of the United
* Attorney, LeClair Ryan, Richmond, Virginia. B.A., 2000, University of Virginia;
J.D., 2005, University of Virginia School of Law. The author practices intellectual property
and business tort litigation. He also represents clients before the Virginia General Assem-
bly and other government bodies in the Commonwealth of Virginia. Before joining LeClair
Ryan, the author clerked for The Honorable Jackson L. Kiser, U.S. District Judge for the
Western District of Virginia; served as the Special Assistant to the Director of Policy in
the Office of Virginia Governor Mark R. Warner; and also served in the Press Office of
Vice President Al Gore. The author is a native of New Market, Virginia.
The author wishes to thank Alana N. Malick, William and Brownie Ritenour, Profes-
sor Robert M. O'Neil, Frank B. Atkinson, Steve Jarding, Michael J. Hertz, and S. Mohsin
Reza. The author warrants that any errors remaining are his.
1. In 1972 Congress passed the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 ("FECA") and
it went into effect upon the President's signature. See Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972)
(codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004)). FECA was most re-
cently and significantly amended by the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002
("BCRA"). See Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002) (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455
(Supp. IV 2004)). BCRA is commonly referred to as the McCain-Feingold legislation,
named after the two United States Senators who introduced the legislation--John McCain
and Russ Feingold. See CNN.com, McCain, Feingold Plan to Introduce Campaign Finance
Bill, Jan. 4, 2001, http://archives.cnn.com/2001/ALLPOLITICS/stories/O1/04/mccain.camp
finance/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2007). John McCain, a Republican, is the senior Senator
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States also has recognized the existence of such corruption and,
accordingly, has upheld much of the campaign finance legislation
enacted by Congress. 2 Nevertheless, actual and apparent corrup-
tion still exists in the federal system, largely because as new re-
forms are enacted, new loopholes are found and exploited by con-
tributors, candidates, and political parties. Indeed, "[c]ampaign
contributions flow like water: whenever one obstacle appears, the
stream is simply diverted until it finds another way to proceed."3
Or as the Supreme Court recognized in McConnell v. FEC,
"Money, like water, will always find an outlet."4
A. The Existence of Actual or Apparent Corruption
While the term "corruption" can take on myriad meanings in a
multitude of contexts, Buckley v. Valeo5 and its progeny seem to
have established that "corruption" generally exists in three forms:
"quid pro quo, monetary influence, and distortion."6 Regardless of
the form it takes, corruption often thrives in the context of financ-
ing campaigns.7 For this reason, Congress has attempted to regu-
from Arizona. Russ Feingold, a Democrat, is the junior Senator from Wisconsin.
2. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
3. John Copeland Nagle, The Recusal Alternative to Campaign Finance Legislation,
37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 69, 70 (2000).
4. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 224; see also Marty Jezer et al., A Proposal for Democrati-
cally Financed Congressional Elections, 11 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 333, 333 (1993) (describ-
ing campaign finance reform legislation as a "pattern" of "insufficient provisions for ad-
ministration and enforcement and sufficient loopholes to undermine the regulations on
campaign contributions").
5. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
6. See Thomas F. Burke, The Concept of Corruption in Campaign Finance Law, 14
CONST. COMMENT. 127, 131 (1997).
7. BCRA's supporters in the Senate recognized that campaign finance reform could
not be achieved without addressing corruption. According to Senator Feingold:
[T]he choice of the word "corruption" is not my choice. It is the standard that
the U.S. Supreme Court has said we have to deal with if we are going to legis-
late in this area. It is not John McCain's word. It is not my word. It is the
word of the Court. The Court said, in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government
PAC: "Buckley demonstrates that the dangers of large, corrupt contributions
and the suspicion that large contributions are corrupt are neither novel nor
implausible. The opinion noted that the deeply disturbing examples surfacing
after the 1972 election demonstrate that the problem of corruption is not an
illusory one." I am sorry the Senator from Kentucky does not want us to talk
about it, but the Court says we can't do a bill about it unless we do talk about
it. So we are going to talk about it. We are going to talk about corruption, but,
more importantly, what is much more obvious and much more relevant is the
appearance of corruption. It is what it does to our Government and our sys-
tem when people think there may be corruption even if it may not exist.
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late the manner in which Americans contribute to campaigns in
order to reduce the actual and apparent corruption.
This commentary focuses on reforming the law that currently
governs campaign finance at the federal level by building on the
laws currently being employed in Virginia. First, this commen-
tary surveys the current culture at the federal level in the cam-
paign finance context, and then examines the constitutional lim-
its on regulating in that arena. Next, the commentary reviews the
legislation that is currently in place to eradicate corruption. The
commentary then evaluates the major shortcomings of these
laws: complexity, ineffectiveness, and infringement on First
Amendment rights.
The focus then turns to the Commonwealth of Virginia: con-
trasting the level of corruption inherent at the federal level with
the culture in Virginia; surveying the laws in place that govern
campaign finance in Virginia; and assessing the key attributes of
Virginia's current laws: simplicity, effectiveness, and harmony
with First Amendment rights.
After evaluating the corruption and the laws designed to im-
pede it at the federal level and in Virginia, the commentary pro-
poses a reform measure that builds on Virginia law in an attempt
to provide simpler, more effective, and less constitutionally offen-
147 CONG. REC. S2433, 2444 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 2001) (statement of Sen. Feingold).
Senator McCain also acknowledged that corruption was the justification for campaign
finance reform: "In 1974, we enacted a law to limit contributions from individuals and po-
litical action committees directly to the candidates. Those laws were not found unconstitu-
tional and vacated by the courts. They were judged lawful for the purpose of preventing
political corruption or the appearance of corruption." 147 CONG. REC. 3135, 3854 (2001).
Furthermore, BCRA's supporters asserted that the appearance of corruption could have
as much, if not more, of a deleterious effect on the electoral process than actual corruption.
Summing up this sentiment, Senator Dodd explained:
The exploding use of soft money that permeates our campaign system is, of
course, having, in the minds of many, a corrupting influence, suggesting that
large contributions by donors to officeholders, candidates, and political par-
ties provide those donors with preferred access and influence over public pol-
icy. Whether or not that is the case is immaterial, I have never suggested, I
have never known of a particular Member whom I thought cast a ballot be-
cause of a contribution. In the minds of most people-a sad commentary,
maybe not most, but many people, that is the case. That is what they think
happens. So it then becomes a fact to them. Whether or not the reality lines
up with that perception is something else. But if in the minds of Americans,
our public citizens at large, in whom we must maintain the confidence of an
electoral democratic process, our campaign financing system is so corrupted
by large contributions, that is a stark reality with which we have to contend.
148 CONG. REC. S2096, 2099 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2002) (statement of Sen. Dodd).
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sive reform at the federal level-the Corruption Abatement Re-
form Statute of Necessity ("CARSON Act").'
B. Corruption Defined
Even though the phrase is central to its holding, the Supreme
Court in Buckley v. Valeo never expressly identified what consti-
tutes the "actuality and appearance of corruption" in the funding
of political campaigns.9 Going a little further to define the term,
the majority in McConnell stated:
More importantly, plaintiffs conceive of corruption too narrowly.
Our cases have firmly established that Congress' legitimate interest
extends beyond preventing simple cash-for-votes corruption to curb-
ing "undue influence on an officeholder's judgment, and the appear-
ance of such influence." Many of the "deeply disturbing examples" of
corruption cited by this Court in Buckley to justify FECA's contribu-
tion limits were not episodes of vote buying, but evidence that vari-
ous corporate interests had given substantial donations to gain ac-
cess to high-level government officials. Even if that access did not
secure actual influence, it certainly gave the "appearance of such in-
fluence."
The record in the present cases is replete with similar examples
of national party committees peddling access to federal candidates
and officeholders in exchange for large soft-money donations. 10
The word "corruption" has not been established as a legal term
of art, and it has diverse meanings to the disparate players who
are engaged in all aspects of campaign finance. "Even the diction-
ary definitions of corruption suggest that it is a tricky term. The
Oxford English Dictionary gives nine basic definitions of corrup-
tion, but there is an element common to all: a notion that some-
thing pure, or natural, or ordered has decayed or become de-
graded."1
As stated above, the Supreme Court seems to identify three
forms of corruption in campaign finance cases: quid pro quo ar-
8. This commentary does not address ethics rules or tenets governing gifts in Vir-
ginia or at the federal level, nor does it address rules that directly govern lobbyists.
9. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26 ("It is unnecessary to look beyond the Act's primary
purpose-to limit the actuality and appearance of corruption resulting from large individ-
ual financial contributions-in order to find a constitutionally sufficient justification for
the $1,000 contribution limitation.").
10. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 150 (2003) (citations omitted).




rangements, monetary influence, and distortion. 2 The term "quid
pro quo" refers to the exchange of votes for money; an exercise of
"turning yarn into cloth"'3 by contributors. The Court in Buckley
opined, "To the extent that large contributions are given to secure
a political quid pro quo from current and potential office holders,
the integrity of our system of representative democracy is under-
mined."' 4
In FEC v. National Conservative Political Action Committee, 15
the Court provided an actual definition of corruption. The defini-
tion includes "quid pro quo," but the Court goes further and ad-
dresses monetary influence more concretely than it did in Buck-
ley:
Corruption is a subversion of the political process. Elected officials
are influenced to act contrary to their obligations of office by the
prospect of financial gain to themselves or infusions of money into
their campaigns. The hallmark of corruption is the financial quid pro
quo: dollars for political favors. 16
By classifying "quid pro quos" as the mere "hallmark" of corrup-
tion and by alluding to the influence that money places on elected
officials, the Court adopted a broader definition of corruption that
includes "monetary influence." 7
In 1990, the Court in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commer-
ce' 8 added distortion to its definition of corruption:
Regardless of whether [the] danger of "financial quid pro quo" cor-
ruption may be sufficient to justify a restriction on independent ex-
penditures, Michigan's regulation aims at a different type of corrup-
tion in the political arena: the corrosive and distorting effects of
immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help
of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the
public's support for the corporation's political ideas. 19
12. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
13. Active Wear, Inc. v. Parkdale Mills, Inc., 331 B.R. 669, 670 (W.D. Va. 2005).
14. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27.
15. 470 U.S. 480 (1985).
16. Id. at 497.
17. See Burke, supra note 6, at 133.
18. 494 U.S. 652 (1990) (upholding a Michigan statute that prohibited corporations
from using corporate treasury funds for independent expenditures in support of, or in op-
position to, state candidates).
19. Id. at 659-60 (citations omitted).
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The Austin Court was thus concerned about large corporate
contributions distorting the political process by compelling
elected officials to govern on behalf of their large corporate con-
tributors as opposed to their constituents. In expressing this con-
cern in its opinion, the Court added "distortion" to its definition of
corruption. 20
II. THE STATUS OF CORRUPTION IN WASHINGTON
The current body of federal campaign finance law is largely de-
signed to mitigate corruption by placing limits on the amounts
that may be contributed to, and received by, candidates for fed-
eral office or the committees that support their candidacy. In
spite of the volume of laws in place,21 the length of the Supreme
Court opinions interpreting those laws,22 and the manner in
which those laws infringe on the First Amendment rights of cam-
paign contributors, 23 the laws have been largely futile in mitigat-
ing corruption at the federal level.
Campaign finance has been at the very root of the largest
scandals to shake Washington, D.C. in modern times.24 Ironically,
one of the arguments against passage of the Bipartisan Cam-
paign Reform Act of 2002 ("BCRA") by its congressional foes was
that the legislation was unnecessary for want of corruption.25
20. See Burke, supra note 6, at 133-34.
21. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
22. See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) (153-page opinion); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (144-page per curiam opinion).
23. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23 (noting that "contribution and expenditure limitations
both implicate fundamental First Amendment interests").
24. See, e.g., CNN.com, House Panel Votes to Expel Traficant, July 18, 2002, http://ar
chives.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/07/18/traficant.ethics/index.html (last visited Sept.
23, 2007); FoxNews.com, Cunningham Quits House in Bribery Flap, Nov. 28, 2005, http://
www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,176885,00.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2007).
25. See 148 CONG. REC. S2119 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2002) (statement of Sen. McConnell)
("Although the facts about the provisions of this bill are almost always misrepresented,
the driving mantra behind the entire movement is that we are all corrupt or that we ap-
pear to be corrupt. We have explored corruption and the appearance of corporation [sic]
before in this Chamber. You cannot have corruption unless someone is corrupt. At no time
has any Member of either body offered evidence of even the slightest hint of corruption by
any Member of either body. As for the appearance of corruption, our friends in the media




Since the passage of BCRA, the "buying" of Washington has
been prominent in the news. Many observers claim that, after the
war in Iraq, corruption in Washington was a leading cause of the
Democratic takeover of both houses of Congress in the 2006 mid-
term elections.2" The biggest scandals to plague Congress over
the last two years have all started with financing campaigns.
Many examples of this type of corruption exist, but none is big-
ger than the scandal involving lobbyist Jack Abramoff. On March
29, 2006, lobbyist Jack Abramoff was sentenced to five years and
ten months in prison after pleading guilty to fraud, tax evasion,
and conspiracy to bribe public officials.27 As part of his deal with
federal prosecutors, Abramoff agreed to cooperate in the investi-
gation of his relationships with members of Congress.2"
Abramoff weaved an intricate web of contacts on Capitol Hill
and engaged in schemes to move money between organizations
over which he had control or in which he had contacts as a means
of pressuring elected officials or buying influence from them.29
The Abramoff scandal was far-reaching in Congress, as it impli-
cated many influential elected officials and staff members. The
two most prominent elected officials to be investigated were Rep-
resentative Tom DeLay, a Republican from Texas, and Represen-
tative Robert Ney, a Republican from Ohio. °
For DeLay, the focus in the Abramoff scandal was on his for-
mer deputy chief of staff, Tony C. Rudy.3 In his plea agreement,
26. Barack Obama, A Chance to Change the Game, WASH. POST, Jan. 4, 2007, at A17
("After a year in which too many scandals revealed the influence special interests wield
over Washington, it's no surprise that so many incumbents were defeated and that polls
said 'corruption' was the grievance cited most frequently by the voters. It would be a mis-
take, however, to conclude that this message was intended for only one party or politi-
cian."); see, e.g., CNN.com, Corruption Named as Key Issue by Voters in Exit Polls, Nov. 7,
2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/ll/07/election.exitpolls/ (last visited Sept. 23,
2007) ("By a wide margin, Americans who voted Tuesday in the midterm election say they
disapprove of the war in Iraq. But when asked which issue was extremely important to
their vote, more voters said corruption and ethics in government than any other issue, in-
cluding the war, according to national exit polls.").




29. Susan Schmidt & James V. Grimaldi, How a Lobbyist Stacked the Deck, WASH.
POST, Oct. 16, 2005, at Al.
30. See Jonathan Weisman, Abramoff Prober Turns Focus on Delay Aide, WASH. POST,
Jan. 8, 2006, at Al.
31. See id.
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Abramoff cited "Staffer A," who has come to be known as Rudy.
Abramoff admitted that in two instances he sought Rudy's help to
stop legislation that would, if passed, prohibit forms of Internet
gambling and effect a postal rate increase.3 2 The plea agreement
stated that, "'With the intent to influence those official acts,'...
Abramoff provided 'things of value, including but not limited to
... ten equal monthly payments totaling $50,000' to Rudy's wife,
Lisa."33 Representative DeLay was involved in both of these legis-
lative matters.34 The Choctaw Indian tribe and eLottery, two
Abramoff clients, underwrote a "lavish golfing trip" to Scotland on
which Abramoff took both Rudy and DeLay in May 2000.31 "Rudy
and Abramoff worked furiously to shoot down the bill prohibiting
Internet gambling, with Rudy firing off e-mails to the lobbyist us-
ing the pronoun 'we' as though he belonged to Abramoff's team."36
DeLay ultimately retired from Congress. He made the an-
nouncement three days after Tony Rudy pleaded guilty to con-
spiracy and corruption charges and told federal prosecutors of a
"criminal enterprise being run out of DeLay's leadership of-
fices."37 Rudy's plea agreement did not allege that DeLay engaged
in any illegal activity, but it placed the "influence-buying efforts
of... Jack Abramoff directly in DeLay's operation."
3
The Abramoff scandal also prompted Representative Robert
Ney to resign from his powerful leadership position as Chairman
of the House Administrative Committee. 9 Ney was the first
elected official to be convicted and sentenced in the larger
Abramoff scandal. 4' Ney admitted that while he was Chairman of
the House Administrative Committee, "he performed official acts
32. Id.
33. Id. ("The Post had previously reported that $25,000 had come from eLottery, Inc.,
an Internet gambling firm, which sent the money to a Seattle-based Orthodox Jewish




37. Jonathan Weisman & Chris Cillizza, DeLay to Resign from Congress, WASH. POST,
Apr. 4, 2006, at Al.
38. Id.
39. See Susan Schmidt & James V. Grimaldi, Ney Pleads Guilty to Corruption
Charges, WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 2006, at Al ("Ney announced in August that he would not
seek reelection and resigned as chairman of the House Administration Committee; the
head of that panel is known as the mayor of Capitol Hill.").
40. Susan Schmidt & James V. Grimaldi, Ney Sentenced to 30 Months in Prison for
AbramoffDeals, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 2007, at A3.
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for Abramoffs lobbying clients between 2001 and 2004, receiving
in exchange luxury vacation trips, skybox seats at sporting
events, campaign contributions and expensive meals. 41 Ney also
admitted that he received "tens of thousands of dollars in gam-
bling chips from a businessman who sought his help with the
State Department."42 For his involvement in corruption, Ney re-
ceived thirty months in federal prison.43 The federal district judge
who sentenced Ney "handed down a tougher sentence than the 27
months recommended by prosecutors," and told Ney that "as a
member of Congress, you had the responsibility above all else to
set an example and to uphold the law."44
Much could be written about the Abramoff scandal and those in
Washington, D.C. who have been caught in its web. Representa-
tive "Ney [was] the eighth person convicted in the continuing fed-
eral investigation into Abramoffs activities."45 A federal task
force consisting of twelve Justice Department prosecutors contin-
ues to investigate dealings between Abramoff and other congres-
sional offices, including those of former Senator Conrad Burns, a
Republican from Montana, and Representative John Doolittle, a
Republican from California.46 The Abramoff scandal makes it
clear that restricting campaign contributions to elected officials is
not enough to thwart corruption.
It is noteworthy that corruption goes beyond elected officials,
as it did in the Abramoff scandal-staff members for elected offi-
cials are often found to be more corrupt than the elected officials
they serve. Additionally, corruption is usually complex and tran-
scends political parties. Furthermore, a great deal of apparent or
actual corruption occurs legally-that is, in technical compliance
with the law. Whatever form the actual or apparent corruption
takes, it is a real-world problem that almost always finds its roots
in the financing of federal campaigns.
An example of legal apparent corruption can be found in the
actions of Democratic House members shortly after they took





45. Schmidt & Grimaldi, supra note 39.
46. See id.
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majority almost instantly began exploiting its new committee
chairmen for fundraising purposes.47 In a ten-day stretch begin-
ning in late February 2007, Democratic fundraisers featured the
chairmen of the House's financial services panel and the House
and Senate tax-writing committees.48
Critics have challenged the aggressive fundraising practice of
giving interest groups access to committee chairmen in exchange
for sizable donations, a practice which polls show was rejected in
the midterm elections in the fall of 2006. 4' Regardless, Democrats
have remained unapologetic.°
Nancy Pelosi, the Democratic Speaker of the House from Cali-
fornia, headlined a fundraiser with the chairmen of House com-
mittees shortly after assuming her new role. The fundraiser bene-
fited the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee
("DCCC"), and the price of $28,500 per couple made it the highest
priced fundraiser of its type since the new campaign finance laws
were enacted in 2002.51 The thirst for giant volumes of campaign
cash in Washington, and the inevitable apparent and actual cor-
ruption that emanates from it, are true signs that reform is
needed.
At the federal level, scandals certainly occur that are not rooted
in campaign finance, 52 but the corruption inherent in the scan-
47. See Jeffrey H. Birnbaum & John Solomon, Democrats Offer up Chairmen for Do-
nors, WASH. POST, Feb. 24, 2007, at Al.
48. Id.
49. See id.
50. Barney Frank, a Democrat from Massachusetts and the new Chairman of the
House Banking Committee who hosted a breakfast in Washington for which donations
ranged from $1,000 to $15,000, stated: "Financial services companies are inclined to give
to me because I'm chairman of the committee important to their interests." When asked if
banking interests feel obligated to contribute when he asks, Frank answered: "Obligated?
No. Incentivized? Yes." Frank did attempt to qualify his answer by stating that those do-
nating "understand, and others do, too, that there are no guarantees of my doing what
they want, or even my being pleasant." Id.
51. Id.
52. An example would be the scandal involving Mark Foley, a six-term Republican
Representative from Florida, which occurred in the fall of 2006. One day after ABC News
reported that he had sent sexually explicit Internet messages to at least one underage
male former page, Mr. Foley resigned from Congress. See ABC World News Tonight (ABC
television broadcast Sept. 29, 2006), available at 2006 WLNR 17014166. Scandals also cer-
tainly exist in the Executive Branch that are not rooted in campaign finance. An example
is President Clinton's scandal with White House intern Monica Lewinsky, or the Bush
Administration's scandal involving the outing to the media of Valerie Plame as a CIA
agent. These scandals do not involve corruption as it has been defined by the Supreme
Court in its campaign finance jurisprudence-quid pro quo, monetary influence, and dis-
[Vol. 42:123
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dals that are grounded in campaign finance are the most invidi-
ous and do the most damage to the reputation of the federal gov-
ernment as an institution. This reality underscores the need for
reform that can simply and effectively deal with this pressing
problem. The current culture in Washington, D.C. illustrates that
in spite of the complexity of current regulation, and its infringe-
ment on First Amendment rights, it is essentially ineffective at
curbing actual or apparent corruption in the context of campaign
finance.
III. FEDERAL LAWS GOVERNING CAMPAIGN FINANCE
In an attempt to provide a brief history of federal campaign fi-
nance regulation and its current status, this commentary begins
with the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 ("FECA")53 and
ends with a description of the campaign finance regulations cur-
rently in place. The historical reach and focus of this discussion is
from 1971 to the present."4
tortion are not usually involved. Additionally, most scandals like those in the Clinton and
Bush administrations that are not rooted in campaign finance do not infer actual or ap-
parent corruption on Congress as a whole or on the Executive branch as an institution.
For instance, when Americans hear about the schemes of Jack Abramoff to employ client
money to buy influence with willing elected officials and their staffs, those Americans are
hearing about actual corruption, and they will often infer, whether founded or not, that
such corruption must also be occurring elsewhere in Congress. However, when a scandal is
not rooted in campaign finance, like the sex scandals involving Mark Foley and Bill Clin-
ton, people tend to judge the individual and not the institution. These examples are scan-
dals for sure, and the individual may be seen as corrupt, but the incident is confined to
that one individual, and does not imply far-reaching institutional corruption like those
scandals rooted in campaign finance.
53. Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455
(2000 & Supp. 2006)).
54. Congress passed the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 and amended that
Act in 1974 in response to the campaign improprieties surrounding the Watergate scandal.
Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1272 (1974). In 1976, FECA was challenged by candidates for
federal offices, political organizations, and political parties in the landmark Supreme
Court case of Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). In Buckley, the Court made significant
changes to FECA. Id. Additionally, in March 2002, Congress passed the Bipartisan Cam-
paign Reform Act ("BCRA"), Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002), which makes major
alterations to the effect FECA had on federal elections. In December 2003, the Supreme
Court largely upheld BCRA in McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 92 (2003).
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A. Buckley's Limitations on Campaign Finance Before the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002
1. Contributions
In Buckley, the supporters of the contribution and expenditure
limitations codified in FECA argued that those limitations regu-
late only conduct, and that their "effect on speech and association
[are] incidental at most."5" The supporters also argued that re-
strictions on campaign contributions are justified because they
prevent "corruption and the appearance of corruption spawned by
the real or imagined coercive influence of large financial contribu-
tions on candidates' positions and on their actions if elected to of-
fice." 6 Those challenging the limits of FECA argued that it's con-
tribution and expenditure restrictions "are at the very core of
political speech, and . . . thus constitute restraints on First
Amendment liberty that are both gross and direct."57
In Buckley, the Supreme Court paid otiose homage to the im-
portance of protecting First Amendment rights:
Discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candi-
dates are integral to the operation of the system of government es-
tablished by our Constitution. The First Amendment affords the
broadest protection to such political expression in order "to assure
[the] unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of politi-
cal and social changes desired by the people .... [Ilt can hardly be
doubted that the constitutional guarantee has its fullest and most
urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political
office."
58
The Court stated, "The First Amendment protects political asso-
ciation as well as political expression,"59 and "[i]n view of the fun-
damental nature of the right to associate, governmental 'action
which may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is
subject to the closest scrutiny.'"6" The Court qualified this, how-
ever, by adding that "' [nieither the right to associate nor the right
55. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 15.
56. Id. at 25.
57. Id. at 15.
58. Id. at 14-15 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) and Monitor
Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971)).
59. Id. at 15.
60. Id. at 25 (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958)).
[Vol. 42:123
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to participate in political activities is absolute,"'61 and by stating
that "[e]ven a 'significant interference with protected rights of po-
litical association' may be sustained if the State demonstrates a
sufficiently important interest and employs means closely drawn
to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms."62
The Buckley Court concluded that "although the Act's contribu-
tion and expenditure limitations both implicate fundamental
First Amendment interests, its expenditure ceilings impose sig-
nificantly more severe restrictions on protected freedoms of politi-
cal expression and association than do its limitations on financial
contributions."63 The Court also stated that expenditure limits
"represent substantial rather than merely theoretical restraints
on the quantity and diversity of political speech,"64 but that con-
tribution limits "entail[] only a marginal restriction upon the con-
tributor's ability to engage in free communication" because a
"contribution serves as a general expression of support for the
candidate and his views, but does not communicate the underly-
ing basis for the support."65 Restriction of contributions, there-
fore, "involves little direct restraint on [the contributor's] political
communication."66 Accordingly, the Court found that Congress
met its burden and held: "It is unnecessary to look beyond the
Act's primary purpose-to limit the actuality and appearance of
corruption resulting from large individual financial contribu-
tions-in order to find a constitutionally sufficient justification
for the $1,000 contribution limitation."67
Based on the verbiage employed by the Court to justify its deci-
sion to uphold the contribution limits, the Court was compelled,
at least in part, by its belief that those restrictions would actually
"limit the actuality and appearance of corruption."6" It is impossi-
ble to know whether the Supreme Court would have upheld the
restrictions had it known they would ultimately prove ineffective,
61. Id. (quoting U.S. Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO,
413 U.S. 548, 567 (1973)).
62. Id. (quoting Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477,488 (1975)).
63. Id. at 23 (emphasis added).
64. Id. at 19.
65. Id. at 20-21.
66. Id. at 21.
67. Id. at 26.
68. Id.
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but such a realization would have, at least, taken this justifica-
tion away from the Court.
2. Expenditures
The Buckley Court took no time in striking down the FECA ex-
penditure restrictions because they unduly infringed on First
Amendment rights:
A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on
political communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the
quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed,
the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached.
This is because virtually every means of communicating ideas in to-
day's mass society requires the expenditure of money.
6 9
3. Disclosure
Under FECA, political action committees ("PAC") are required
to keep reports of contributions and expenditures, and to file such
reports quarterly with the Federal Election Commission
("FEC").7 ° The Buckley Court applied a strict scrutiny test to de-
termine whether the disclosure requirements of FECA are consti-
tutional "because compelled disclosure has the potential for sub-
stantially infringing the exercise of First Amendment rights."71
The Court recognized that it had previously "acknowledged that
there are governmental interests sufficiently important to out-
weigh the possibility of infringement, particularly when the 'free
functioning of our national institutions' is involved."72 Ultimately,
the Court held that "[tihe governmental interests sought to be
vindicated by the disclosure requirements are of this magni-
tude."73
69. Id. at 19.
70. See id. at 63-64. The reports must include the name and address of each individ-
ual contributing in excess of $10, and his occupation and principal place of business if his
contribution exceeds $100. The reports also must include the contribution recipient and
purpose of expenditures over $100. Every individual or group that is not a candidate or a
political committee must file a statement with the FEC if it makes a contribution or ex-
penditure over $100 other than by contribution to a political committee or candidate. See
id.
71. Id. at 66.
72. Id. (quoting Communist Party of the U.S. v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367
U.S. 1, 97 (1961)).
73. Id. According to the Buckley Court, the government's sufficiently important inter-
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The Court agreed with the concession made by the challengers
of FECA "that disclosure requirements-certainly in most appli-
cations-appear to be the least restrictive means of curbing the
evils of campaign ignorance and corruption that Congress found
to exist."74
However, the Court also recognized that "[in some instances,
disclosure may even expose contributors to harassment or retalia-
tion," that "[t]hese are not insignificant burdens on individual
rights, and [that] they must be weighed carefully against the in-
terests which Congress has sought to promote by [the] legisla-
tion."7' The Court further declared that "[t]here could well be a
case . . . where the threat to the exercise of First Amendment
rights is so serious and the state interest furthered by disclosure
so insubstantial that the Act's requirements cannot be constitu-
tionally applied."76 The Buckley Court then described the type of
disclosure requirements that should be constitutionally rejected-
ests fell into three categories. "First, disclosure provides the electorate with information
'as to where political campaign money comes from and how it is spent by the candidate' in
order to aid the voters in evaluating those who seek federal office." Id. at 66-67 (quoting
H.R. REP. No. 92-564, at 4 (1971)). The Court continued: "The sources of a candidate's fi-
nancial support also alert the voter to the interests to which a candidate is most likely to
be responsive and thus facilitate predictions of future performance in office." Id. at 67. The
Court's argument was one for democracy: educate the voter about the candidate's sources
of campaign contributions, and allow the voter to determine if such a candidate is worthy
of the voter's support.
The Buckley Court found the government's second sufficiently important interest to be
that "disclosure requirements deter actual corruption and avoid the appearance of corrup-
tion by exposing large contributions and expenditures to the light of publicity." Id. The
Court continued by pointing out that "[t]his exposure may discourage those who would use
money for improper purposes either before or after the election. A public armed with in-
formation about a candidate's most generous supporters is better able to detect any post-
election special favors that may be given in return." Id. The Court even pointed out that
"Congress could reasonably conclude that full disclosure during an election campaign
tends 'to prevent the corrupt use of money to affect elections."' Id. (quoting Burroughs v.
United States, 290 U.S. 534, 548 (1933)). To further its position, the Court cited Justice
Sutherland on the issue, who said, "[I]nformed public opinion is the most potent of all re-
straints upon misgovernment." Id. n.79 (quoting Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233,
250 (1936)).
The Court endorsed the government's third sufficiently important interest when it
granted that "recordkeeping, reporting, and disclosure requirements are an essential
means of gathering the data necessary to detect violations of the contribution limitations."
1d. at 67-68.
74. Id. at 68.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 71.
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"where ... the type of chill and harassment identified in NAACP
v. Alabama can be shown."77
The Buckley opinion, therefore, left the door open for contribu-
tors to challenge the FECA disclosure laws when such disclosure
leads to real "harassment or retaliation."" In NAACP v. Ala-
bama, NAACP members challenged Alabama's organization dis-
closure laws.79 In that case, the Supreme Court struck down the
Alabama disclosure law insofar as it required the NAACP to pro-
vide the Alabama Attorney General with a complete list of its
members."0 The Supreme Court held that because of the funda-
mental nature of the right to associate, "state action which may
have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to
the closest scrutiny."8 1
The Buckley Court, however, held that serious threats stem-
ming from disclosure had not been identified by the challengers,
and declared that threats serious enough to deem disclosure re-
quirements unconstitutional would be extremely rare:
[N]o appellant in this case has tendered record evidence of the sort
proffered in NAACP v. Alabama .... At best they offer the testimony
of several minor-party officials that one or two persons refused to
make contributions because of the possibility of disclosure. On this
record, the substantial public interest in disclosure identified by the
legislative history of this Act outweighs the harm generally al-
leged.8 2
Finally, the Court concluded that it could "find no constitu-
tional infirmities in the recordkeeping, reporting, and disclosure
provisions of the Act." 3 The Court said the disclosure require-
ments of FECA have "the potential for substantially infringing
the exercise of First Amendment rights," 4 that the requirements
have "the possibility of infringement," 5 and that the require-
ments may be a "threat to the exercise of First Amendment
77. Id. at 74 (citing NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958)).
78. Id. at 68.
79. NAACP, 357 U.S. 449.
80. Id. at 466.
81. Id. at 460-61.
82. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 71-72.
83. Id. at 84.
84. Id. at 66 (emphasis added).
85. Id. (emphasis added).
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rights." 6 But the Court never said the disclosure requirements
actually do infringe on First Amendment rights. It follows from
the manner in which the Court upheld the disclosure require-
ments that a system of full disclosure, without further restric-
tions, would not infringe on the First Amendment rights of citi-
zens, except in rare cases. Furthermore, the Buckley Court
seemed to endorse disclosure as an effective weapon against the
actuality and appearance of corruption in politics associated with
the financing of federal campaigns.
B. Supreme Court Action After Buckley and Before McConnell
The Supreme Court dealt with many cases challenging FECA
between the time it decided Buckley and the time it heard
McConnell v. FEC. 7 The Supreme Court also had ample oppor-
tunity to review cases challenging state campaign finance laws in
those same years. 8 While the focus of this commentary is clearly
on the Supreme Court's seminal review in Buckley and McCon-
nell, the Court's action in two related cases in the interim is also
worth noting.
In Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. FEC,
the petitioner, prior to selecting its candidate for the Senate,
bought radio advertisements attacking the Democratic Party's
86. Id. at 71 (emphasis added).
87. See, e.g., FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146 (2003) (holding that provisions of the Act
barring direct corporate campaign contributions to nonprofit advocacy group were consis-
tent with the First Amendment); Bread Political Action Comm. v. FEC, 455 U.S. 577
(1982) (holding that political action committee did not have standing to challenge constitu-
tionality of Act); Cal. Med. Ass'n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182 (1981) (holding that the Act's cam-
paign contribution limit does not violate the First Amendment).
88. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000) (upholding Missouri law
that placed limits on the contributions that could be made to state candidates on the
ground that there was a legitimate state interest in limiting those contributions as a way
of curbing the apparent or actual corruption that flows from large contributions); Brown v.
Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 88 (1982) (overruling the Ohio Cam-
paign Expense Reporting Law as a violation of the First Amendment and holding that the
disclosure requirements could not be constitutionally applied to the Socialist Party activ-
ists because their minor party had historically been the subject of harassment by govern-
ment officials and private parties); Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S.
290 (1981) (striking down California law that limited contributions to committees estab-
lished to advocate for or against ballot initiatives to $250 as a violation of First Amend-
ment rights); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (striking down a
Massachusetts law that prevented banks and corporations from making certain expendi-
tures for the purpose of influencing the vote on a referendum proposal).
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candidate.8 9 The FEC brought charges alleging that the Colorado
Republican Federal Campaign Committee had violated FECA by
exceeding the limit on campaign contributions.9" The Supreme
Court reversed the Tenth Circuit, holding that the First Amend-
ment prohibited the application of FECA's campaign contribution
limits to expenditures that the political party made without hav-
ing coordination with any candidate. 9'
Five years later, in FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Cam-
paign Committee, or Colorado II as it became known, the Su-
preme Court addressed whether FECA's contribution restrictions
could constitutionally apply to expenditures made by the Colo-
rado Republican Federal Campaign Committee in coordination
with a candidate.92 The Court again reversed the Tenth Circuit in
holding that, unlike truly uncoordinated expenditures, coordi-
nated expenditures by the party could be constitutionally re-
stricted to minimize abuse of the contribution limits. 93
The Supreme Court reviewed several cases in the realm of
campaign finance between Buckley and McConnell, but its hold-
ings in Colorado I and II provided some of the clearest guidance
for future legislation. Campaign finance laws evolved a great deal
in the thirty-one years after the original passage of FECA, mostly
by way of Supreme Court opinion, but in 2002 the BCRA provided
an evolution in campaign finance law by way of legislation.
C. Limits on Campaign Finance After McConnell's Review of the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002
1. Overview of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002
The Supreme Court in Buckley limited the scope of FECA to
forbid corporations and unions from using money from their cor-
porate treasuries to fund political advertisements that employed
express (or "magic") words of advocacy, such as "'vote for,' 'elect,'
'support,' 'cast your ballot for,' 'Smith for Congress,' 'vote against,'
89. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 608 (1996).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 437 (2001).
93. Id. at 465.
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'defeat,' [or] 'reject."'94 However, corporations and unions could
easily circumvent these regulations by funding advertisements
that advocated for or against a given candidate, but which did not
employ the express words prohibited by law. This ease of circum-
vention led to an increase in corporate and union spending on ad-
vertisements designed to influence federal elections.95 Addition-
ally, contributions were being made in great quantities to
organizations that, under FECA, could accept contributions of
any amount and spend those contributions on behalf of a candi-
date or candidates as long as there was no coordination between
the source and the candidate(s). These unregulated contributions
are referred to as soft money.
BCRA was designed to prevent such circumvention and profi-
teering from soft money. To do this, BCRA sought to restrict all
corporate and union spending on political advertisements that
reference a federal candidate and that are broadcast in the weeks
immediately leading up to a federal election, regardless of the
verbiage employed in the advertisements.96
BCRA contains five titles, but the first two are the most rele-
vant to this commentary. Title I prohibits national political par-
ties, federal officeholders, and candidates from raising and spend-
ing soft money.97 Title II places restrictions on corporations and
unions and their ability to influence federal elections, primarily
by prohibiting them from funding campaign advertisements.9" Ti-
tle II also provides a new definition of "electioneering communica-
tion" to address candidate-specific issue ads.99
BCRA created the term "electioneering communication," and
defined it as any television or radio advertisement that clearly
identifies a candidate or candidates seeking federal office in the
94. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 n.52 (1976).
95. Spencer Overton, Restraint and Responsibility: Judicial Review of Campaign Re-
form, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 663, 671 (2004).
96. See id. at 672 (citing Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-
155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455 (Supp. IV 2004))).
97. 2 U.S.C. § 441i; see also Frank J. Favia, Jr., Note, Enforcing the Goals of the Bi-
partisan Campaign Reform Act: Silencing Nonprofit Groups and Stealth PACs in Federal
Elections, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 1081, 1085.
98. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2); see also Michael Saxl & Maeghan Maloney, The Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act: Unintended Consequences and the Maine Solution, 41 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 465, 468 (2004).
99. 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3); see also Favia, supra note 97, at 1085.
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viewing area where the advertisement is broadcast. 100 An adver-
tisement constitutes an "electioneering communication" if it is
broadcast "60 days before a general, special, or runoff election" or
"30 days before a primary or preference election."1' Though
BCRA placed a novel term and definition in play, it did not ex-
pressly reject the magic words test that the Supreme Court cre-
ated in Buckley. 11
2
Congress provided an alternative definition of "electioneering
communication" in BCRA as insurance in case the first definition
is deemed unconstitutional by the courts: "any television or radio
advertisement that, regardless of express advocacy, promotes,
supports, attacks, or opposes a candidate, and cannot be con-
strued in any manner other than to urge the public to vote for or
against a candidate;" this definition included no time restric-
tion. 10 3 Furthermore, BCRA delegates authority to the FEC to
create its own exemptions to the definition of "electioneering
communication" as long as those exemptions do not allow adver-
tisements that "promote, support, attack, or oppose a Federal
candidate."1 °4
BCRA bans any "electioneering communication" that is funded
by corporations or unions, directly or indirectly. 05 Other organi-
zations, however, are left untouched and unregulated by BCRA.
For example, 501(c)(3) corporations, Qualified Nonprofit Corpora-
tions ("QNCs"), unincorporated 501(c)(4) organizations, and 527
organizations are not covered by BCRA. °6 Still, BCRA prohibits
such organizations from making "electioneering communications"
if they accept corporate or union funds, intermingle those funds
with contributions made by individuals, or use those funds to
make "targeted communications"-which encompasses all "elec-
tioneering communications."1°7
100. 2 U.S.C. § 434(f(3)(A)(i); see also Daniel B. Roth, Comment, Campaign Finance
Reform, Electioneering Communications, and the First Amendment: Resuscitating the
Third Exception, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1315, 1320-21 (2005).
101. 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(i)(II).
102. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 n.52 (1976).
103. Roth, supra note 100, at 1321 (citing 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(ii)).
104. Id. (citing 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(B)(iv)).
105. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2).
106. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(c)(2); see also Sax] & Maloney, supra note 98, at 468-69.
107. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(c)(3), (6); see also Roth, supra note 100, at 1322.
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In short, BCRA place greater limits on how corporate and labor
treasury funds can be used in federal elections, on the sources
and sizes of political party contributions, and on the type of funds
that may be used for campaign advertising.'O8 BCRA's limitations
require that national party committees use only hard money-
money governed by federal contribution limits-to finance their
political activities. 09
2. The McConnell Court's Upholding of BCRA
Immediately after President Bush signed BCRA into law, Sena-
tor Mitch McConnell filed suit, with a bevy of other plaintiffs,
challenging the constitutionality of several provisions of the
Act."' The plaintiffs' suit was based primarily on the theory that
the definition of "electioneering communications," and the ban on
such communications when paid for with corporate money, was
vague and violated fundamental First Amendment rights. "
In McConnell, the Supreme Court upheld the provision of
BCRA that prohibits corporate and union funding of political ad-
vertisements in the weeks preceding an election. 112 The Court de-
termined that the number of such advertisements that posed no
threat of corruption was small in comparison to the number of
corrupting activities that would occur without the restriction."3
In rejecting the plaintiffs' overbreadth claims, the majority voiced
its concern about corporate and union expenditures influencing
elected officials and the real or potential corruption that could re-
sult."'
The Court ruled that Congress's interest in preventing corpora-
tions and unions from unduly influencing an election is signifi-
cant enough to outweigh any First Amendment infringement
caused by BCRA. "'
108. See Favia, supra note 97, at 1085.
109. Id.
110. Favia, supra note 97, at 1086.
111. Roth, supra note 100, at 1322-23 (citing Neil A. Lewis & Richard A. Oppel Jr.,
Campaign Finance: The Overview; Mixed Ruling on Constitutionality of New Campaign
Finance Law, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2003, at Al).
112. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 141-85 (2003).
113. Overton, supra note 95, at 668.
114. See id.
115. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 207 ("We are therefore not persuaded that plaintiffs
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In his dissent, Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, opined that Congress's interest in
preventing the appearance of corruption did not outweigh First
Amendment interests. 116 Justice Kennedy's dissent noted that the
laws which regulate the spending on express advocacy are easy to
circumvent, 117 and he agreed with the majority's decision to up-
hold the provisions of BCRA which require the disclosure of elec-
tioneering communications."' However, the dissent ultimately
concluded that BCRA's restrictions on corporate and union elec-
tioneering expenditures were over-inclusive, describing the elec-
tioneering communication "provision, 'with its crude temporal
and geographic proxies,' as 'a severe and unprecedented ban on
protected speech' because reference to an elected official often fa-
cilitates communication about pending legislation and other mat-
ters that pose no threat of corruption."" 9
Ultimately the Kennedy dissent concluded:
In defending against a facial attack on a statute with substantial
overbreadth, it is no answer to say that corporations and unions may
bring as-applied challenges on a case-by-case basis. When a statute
is as out of bounds as [the restriction on corporate and union elec-
tioneering], our law simply does not force speakers to "undertake the
considerable burden (and sometimes risk) of vindicating their rights
through case-by-case litigation." If they instead "abstain from pro-
tected speech," they "harm not only themselves but society as a
whole, which is deprived of an uninhibited marketplace of ideas."
Not the least of the ill effects of today's decision is that our over-
breadth doctrine, once a bulwark of protection for free speech, has
have carried their heavy burden .... Even if we assumed that BCRA will inhibit some
constitutionally protected corporate and union speech, that assumption would not 'justify
prohibiting all enforcement' of the law unless its application to protected speech is sub-
stantial, 'not only in an absolute sense, but also relative to the scope of the law's plainly
legitimate applications.' Far from establishing that BCRA's application to pure issue ads is
substantial, either in an absolute sense or relative to its application to election-related ad-
vertising, the record strongly supports the contrary conclusion.") (quoting Virginia v.
Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119-20 (2003)).
116. Id. at 291-98 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also Overton, supra note 95, at 681.
117. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 323 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("The Government and the
majority are right about one thing: The express-advocacy requirement, with its list of
magic words, is easy to circumvent."); see also Overton, supra note 95, at 681.
118. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 321; see also Overton, supra note 95, at 681.




now been manipulated by the Court to become but a shadow of its
former self. 1
20
Justice Scalia, writing separately in dissent, took a similar tone
in describing the extent to which BCRA infringes on First
Amendment rights:
It should be obvious, then, that a law limiting the amount a person
can spend to broadcast his political views is a direct restriction on
speech. That is no different from a law limiting the amount a news-
paper can pay its editorial staff or the amount a charity can pay its
leafletters. It is equally clear that a limit on the amount a candidate
can raise from any one individual for the purpose of speaking is also
a direct limitation on speech. That is no different from a law limiting
the amount a publisher can accept from any one shareholder or
lender, or the amount a newspaper can charge any one advertiser or
customer. 121
Thus, the dissenters in McConnell concluded that the restric-
tions were overly broad because they would limit many adver-
tisements that would not pose a threat of corruption.
The McConnell dissenters would be vindicated four years later
by the Court's decision in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. 122
In Wisconsin Right to Life, the BCRA restrictions on advertising
were tested as applied to advertisements being aired by Wiscon-
sin Right to Life. The ads were aired, and scheduled for further
airing, within thirty days of a primary election. The ads stated
that Senate filibustering during the judicial nominating process
was merely a delay tactic, named specific Senators, and advo-
cated that people contact those Senators. While admitting that
the ads violated BCRA, the organization contended that BCRA
was unconstitutionally overbroad, as applied to the ads, because
the ads were directed at a specific political issue and not at the
election of specific candidates. The Court held that BCRA was
unconstitutional in its blocking of the ads, but the Court could not
form a consensus on the grounds for its unconstitutional find-
ing. 123
120. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 336 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
121. Id. at 254-55 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
122. 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007).
123. Announcing the judgment of the Court, Chief Justice Roberts wrote:
Last Term, we reversed a lower court ruling, arising in the same litigation
before us now, that our decision in McConnell left "no room" for as-applied
challenges to § 203 [of BCRA]. We held on the contrary that "[i]n upholding §
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In McConnell, the Court also considered whether the appear-
ance of corruption is sufficient to justify the First Amendment in-
fringement that comes with regulating expenditures of campaign
contributions. 124 As stated above, the Buckley Court held that
regulating expenditures represented an unconstitutional in-
fringement on First Amendment rights. 125 Without expressly
overruling Buckley, the McConnell Court held that Congress's in-
terest in regulating expenditures was sufficient, where Buckley
had found it to be insufficient. 126
Finally, the McConnell Court held that the definition of "elec-
tioneering communication" was not unconstitutionally vague be-
cause a reasonable person could determine what the definition
does and does not entail. 127 The Court refused to address the suf-
ficiency of the second definition of "electioneering communication"
because it upheld the first. 128
In sum, the McConnell majority upheld BCRA almost in its en-
tirety. The Court upheld: BCRA's ban on national party commit-
203 against a facial challenge, we did not purport to resolve future as-applied
challenges."
We now confront such an as-applied challenge. Resolving it requires us
first to determine whether the speech at issue is the "functional equivalent"
of speech expressly advocating the election or defeat of a candidate for federal
office, or instead a "genuine issue ad." We have long recognized that the dis-
tinction between campaign advocacy and issue advocacy "may often dissolve
in practical application. Candidates, especially incumbents, are intimately
tied to public issues involving legislative proposals and governmental ac-
tions." Our development of the law in this area requires us, however, to draw
such a line, because we have recognized that the interests held to justify the
regulation of campaign speech and its "functional equivalent" "might not ap-
ply" to the regulation of issue advocacy.
In drawing that line, the First Amendment requires us to err on the side
of protecting political speech rather than suppressing it. We conclude that the
speech at issue in this as-applied challenge is not the "functional equivalent"
of express campaign speech. We further conclude that the interests held to
justify restricting corporate campaign speech or its functional equivalent do
not justify restricting issue advocacy, and accordingly we hold that BCRA §
203 is unconstitutional as applied to the advertisements at issue in these
cases.
FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2659 (2007) (citing Wisconsin
Right to Life, Inc. v Federal Election Comm'n, 546 U.S. 410, 411-12 (2006) (per cu-
riam); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 206; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 42 (1976) (per cu-
riam); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 206 n.88 (internal citations omitted)).
124. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 156.
125. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39-59 (1976).
126. Roth, supra note 100, at 1323 n.69 (citing McConnell, 540 U.S. at 156).
127. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 194.
128. Id. at 190 n.73.
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tees and their agents soliciting, receiving, or spending soft
money;129 BCRA's ban on donors "contributing nonfederal funds
to state and local party committees to help finance 'federal elec-
tion activity; '  and Congress's ability to "prohibit national,
state, and local political party committees, and their agents or
subsidiaries, from soliciting any funds for, or making or directing
any donations to, certain tax-exempt organizations that make ex-
penditures in connection with elections for federal office."131
The Court also upheld BCRA's prohibition against federal can-
didates and officeholders "soliciting, receiving, directing, trans-
ferring or spending soft money in connection with federal elec-
tions," along with its limits on "the ability of federal candidates
and officeholders to solicit, receive, direct, transfer, or spend soft
money in connection with state and local elections." 32 Addition-
ally, the McConnell Court upheld BCRA's prohibition against
state and local officeholders and candidates "spending soft money
to fund communications that refer to a clearly identified candi-
date for federal office and that promote, support, attack or oppose
a candidate for that office."133
Furthermore, the court upheld the "electioneering communica-
tions" provisions of BCRA that prevent corporations and unions
from funding "broadcast communications that refer to clearly
identified candidates for federal office, made within sixty days of
a general election or thirty days of a primary," and that target the
area where the candidate is seeking federal office.134 Signifi-
cantly, the Court upheld the disclosure rules outlined by BCRA
with regard to "electioneering communications."''
In upholding BCRA, the Court expressly stated that "the stat-
ute's two principal, complementary features-Congress's effort to
129. See Richard L. Hasen, Buckley is Dead, Long Live Buckley: The New Campaign
Finance Incoherence of McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 31,
47 (2004) (citing McConnell, 540 U.S. at 142-61).
130. Id. (citing McConnell, 540 U.S. at 161-73).
131. Id. (citing McConnell, 540 U.S. at 181).
132. Id. (citing McConnell, 540 U.S. at 181-84).
133. Id. at 48 (citing McConnell, 540 U.S. at 184-85).
134. Id. (citing McConnell, 540 U.S. at 203-09).
135. Id. at 48 n.90 (citing McConnell, 540 U.S. at 194-202).
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plug the soft-money loophole and its regulation of electioneering
communications-must be upheld in the main."'
136
3. The Status of Contribution Restrictions After McConnell
Under BCRA, an individual is permitted to contribute up to
$2,300 to the committee of any federal candidate per election cy-
cle.137 This amount and the amounts that follow are the maxi-
mums for the 2008 election cycle. 3' An individual can contribute
up to $28,500 per year to any national political party committee,
$10,000 per year to any state or local political party committee,
and $5,000 per year to a federal PAC or other federal political
committee."39 An individual is also limited in the aggregate total
he may contribute in a two-year election cycle. 140
An individual can contribute up to an aggregate of $108,200
per two-year election cycle by contributing up to $42,700 per elec-
tion cycle to the committees of federal political candidates, and up
to $65,500 per election cycle to national party committees and/or
federal PACs-of Which no more than $40,000 can go to federal
PACs per election cycle. 14' BCRA allows opponents of self-
financing candidates to raise money in larger quantities. 142
BCRA did not alter the FECA contribution limits on multi-
candidate committees. 143 These committees can contribute up to
136. Favia, supra note 97, at 1086 (paraphrasing McConnell, 540 U.S. at 224).
137. See Opensecrets.org, Federal Campaign Finance Law: Contribution Limits, http:/!
www.opensecrets.org/basics/law/index.asp (last visited Sept. 23, 2007). A primary election
cycle is counted separately from a general election cycle. That is, contribution limits de-
fined per election allow the given amount to be contributed once before the primary elec-
tion is held and again after the primary but before the general election is held. See id. at
n.1.
138. Some of the individual contribution limits under BCRA are indexed for inflation
and adjust accordingly each election cycle. For instance, an individual could contribute up
to $2,100 to the committee of any federal candidate in the 2006 election cycle that ended




142. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(i) (Supp. IV 2004).
143. A multi-candidate committee has more than fifty contributors, has been registered
for at least six months, and has contributed to five or more federal candidates. A state po-
litical party committee does not have to contribute to five or more federal candidates to
qualify as a multi-candidate committee. The amount that may be contributed by a multi-
candidate committee is not indexed for inflation and therefore does not adjust per election
cycle. See Opensecrets.org, supra note 137.
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$5,000 to any federal candidate's committee per election cycle;
$15,000 to any national political party committee per year; and
$5,000 to any PAC, state or local political party, or other political
committee per year.'44 No aggregate spending limits, per year or
per election cycle, are in place for multi-candidate committees. 
145
Under BCRA, other political committees may contribute $2,300
to any federal candidate's committee per election cycle and
$28,500 to any national political party committee per year. 146 The
committees may contribute $10,000 per year to a state or local po-
litical party committee and $5,000 per year to a federal PAC or
other political committee. 147 These political committees are sub-
ject to the two-year election cycle aggregate maximum of
$108,200, of which no more than $42,700 may be contributed to a
single candidate's committee per election cycle. 4 '
In placing limits on the amounts that may be contributed,
BCRA also places limits on the amounts and manner in which
contributions may be received. National political parties are pro-
hibited from accepting contributions in excess of the statutory
limits, but they also cannot "solicit, receive or direct" contribu-
tions to other organizations. 149 The FEC interprets this language
to prohibit a national political party from asking a contributor to
contribute to another organization.'5
D. The Most Significant Shortcomings of Current Federal
Campaign Finance Laws
1. The Complexity of Current Regulation
Not only do loopholes make legislating against campaign fi-
nance corruption difficult, but the complexity of the enacted laws
makes both compliance and enforcement onerous. Federal cam-
paign finance legislation consumes hundreds of pages of the






149. Sax] & Maloney, supra note 98, at 467 (quoting 2 U.S.C. § 441i(a)).
150. Id.
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FECA was enacted. Adding additional complexity, the two most
prominent Supreme Court cases that have dealt with constitu-
tional challenges to federal campaign finance legislation, Buckley
and McConnell, have opinions of 144 and 153 pages, respec-
tively. 15'
The complexity of the current scheme places a great burden on
a candidate for federal office. Understanding campaign finance
laws may be the greatest challenge for a candidate who seeks fed-
eral office for the first time. If a new candidate solicits contribu-
tions without a sound understanding of the law, he can subject
himself and his campaign to serious penalties and to serious em-
barrassment that can be exploited by his opponent. Citizens who
wish to seek federal office should be able to readily understand
the campaign finance laws enacted by their government. How-
ever, the current laws are often too complex and convoluted for
even the most sophisticated candidate to decipher. It is unfair to
candidates, to the public, and to democracy to place such a great
burden on a person who merely wishes to become involved in the
political process.
2. The Ineffectiveness of Current Regulation
Despite the complexity of federal campaign finance restrictions,
the actual and apparent corruption that is grounded in campaign
finance is not being curbed at the federal level. As stated above,
actual or apparent corruption generally exists in three forms:
quid pro quo, monetary influence, and distortion. To be effective,
the current federal scheme should curb these three forms of cor-
ruption in their actual and apparent forms. Even with its com-
plexity, broad reach, and infringement on core First Amendment
rights, the current federal scheme has done little to hold down ac-
tual and apparent corruption.
FECA was in effect the entire time (and BCRA was in effect
most of the time) that Representative Robert Ney was engaging
in a quid pro quo arrangement with Jack Abramoff.5 2 Ney's ac-
tions are an example of actual quid pro quo, but the fact that
151. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
152. See Schmidt & Grimaldi, supra note 39. (Bob Ney admitted that as Chairman of
the House Administrative Committee "he performed official acts for Abramof's lobbying
clients between 2001 and 2004, receiving in exchange luxury vacation trips, skybox seats
at sporting events, campaign contributions and expensive meals.").
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American citizens assume that other federal politicians are en-
gaging in similar acts illustrates that apparent quid pro quo is
also occurring under the watch of current law.
Nor does it seem that FECA, BCRA, or the Supreme Court
cases interpreting them, with all of their complexities, have in
any way cut down on monetary influence at the federal level. The
Abramoff scandal again provides evidence of the corruption, by
way of monetary influence, that is grounded in campaign contri-
butions at the federal level. Tom DeLay's deputy chief of staff,
Tony Rudy, and Representative Ney certainly fell prey to mone-
tary influence; the current federal campaign finance laws could
not prevent it.
Finally, the current federal campaign finance laws have not
prevented contributions from distorting the way business is done
in Washington, D.C. An example of such distortion in current
practice is the fundraising antics of the House Democrats. Almost
instantly after taking over as the Congressional majority in 2007,
they began exploiting their committee chairmen for fundraising
purposes. 153 It is ironic that the actions of the new Democratic
majority would serve as an example of the distorting effect of
campaign contributions when many commentators cite corruption
as one of the main issues that led voters to pick the new majority
in November 2006.154 Nonetheless, there can be no question that
distortion of the political process at the federal level is borne in
the sizable contributions solicited by the new Democratic major-
ity, the special interests that make those contributions, and the
access those special interests garner with their contributions.
3. The First Amendment Constitutional Infringement of Current
Regulation
When the constitutionality of FECA was tested in Buckley, the
Supreme Court struck down the limits placed on campaign ex-
penditures, holding that such limits unconstitutionally infringe
on First Amendment rights because they "place substantial and
direct restrictions on the ability of candidates, citizens, and asso-
153. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
154. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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ciations to engage in protected political expression, restrictions
that the First Amendment cannot tolerate."
155
At the same time, the Buckley Court held that contribution lim-
its also infringe on First Amendment rights: "[C]ontribution and
expenditure limitations both implicate fundamental First
Amendment interests." 156 However, the Court upheld the contri-
bution limits: "It is unnecessary to look beyond the Act's primary
purpose-to limit the actuality and appearance of corruption re-
sulting from large individual financial contributions-in order to
find a constitutionally sufficient justification for the ... contribu-
tion limitation[s]."' 57
This restriction of contributions, a recognized limit on political
speech and association, was found to be constitutional in spite of
the First Amendment's express language: "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to pe-
tition the Government for a redress of grievances."15 1 McConnell
sustained this way of thinking:
In Buckley and subsequent cases, we have subjected restrictions
on campaign expenditures to closer scrutiny than limits on campaign
contributions. In these cases we have recognized that contribution
limits, unlike limits on expenditures, "entai[1] only a marginal re-
striction upon the contributor's ability to engage in free communica-
tion."
Our treatment of contribution restrictions reflects more than the
limited burdens they impose on First Amendment freedoms.
Considerations of stare decisis, buttressed by the respect that the
Legislative and Judicial Branches owe to one another, provide addi-
tional powerful reasons for adhering to the analysis of contribution
limits that the Court has consistently followed since Buckley was de-
cided. 159
155. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 1, 58-59.
156. Id. at 23.
157. Id. at 26.
158. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
159. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 134-38 (2003) (citations omitted).
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The McConnell Court also recognized the First Amendment in-
fringement of BCRA when it dealt with the plaintiffs' overbreadth
claims:
We are therefore not persuaded that plaintiffs have carried their
heavy burden.... Even if we assumed that BCRA will inhibit some
constitutionally protected corporate and union speech, that assump-
tion would not "justify prohibiting all enforcement" of the law unless
its application to protected speech is substantial, "not only in an ab-
solute sense, but also relative to the scope of the law's plainly legiti-
mate applications." Far from establishing that BCRA's application to
pure issue ads is substantial, either in an absolute sense or relative
to its application to election-related advertising, the record strongly
supports the contrary conclusion. 16
0
The Court in McConnell and Buckley relied on Congress's pri-
mary purpose in implementing contribution restrictions, "to limit
the actuality and appearance of corruption resulting from large
individual contributions-in order to find constitutionally suffici-
ent justification" for those restrictions.16 1 It is important to note,
as outlined above, that this very "justification" on which the
Court relies to allow this constitutional infringement to occur has
proven ineffective in practice at curbing actual or apparent cor-
ruption in the federal system.
Thus, the Supreme Court held in Buckley, and reaffirmed in
McConnell, that current federal campaign contribution limita-
tions, in FECA and BCRA, infringe on the fundamental First
Amendment rights of free speech and political association that
are guaranteed to every American by the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution. While the Court held in both cases
that this infringement was justified as a means by which to curb
actual or apparent corruption, and is therefore a constitutional
infringement, the Court's holdings nonetheless recognize that in-
fringement is occurring. 161
160. Id. at 207.
161. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26 (1976).
162. George Will, Fending Off the Speech Police, JEWISH WORLD REV., Mar. 12, 2001,
available at http://www.jewishworldreview.com/cols/will031201.asp ("Today Internet por-
nography is protected from regulation, but not Internet political speech. And campaign
finance 'reformers' aspire to much, much more regulation because, they say, there is 'too
much money in politics."').
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IV. THE STATUS OF CORRUPTION IN VIRGINIA
Unlike Washington, D.C., Virginia has been home to few mod-
ern corruption scandals arising from campaign finance. As dis-
cussed above, the funding of campaigns in Virginia operates un-
der a system that does not rely on contribution limits, but merely
requires the full disclosure of contributions exceeding $100.163
In the last two Virginia statewide elections held in 2001 and
2005, there have been only two situations where campaign con-
tributions were called into question. Neither situation rose to the
level of being an important issue in its respective campaign, and
both situations involved an issue with disclosure.
The campaign finance situation that occurred at the outset of
the 2001 gubernatorial election had more public relations impli-
cations than legal implications. 164 In the spring of 2001, former
Virginia Attorney General Mark L. Earley held a press confer-
ence with supporters to officially announce his candidacy for gov-
ernor. At the press conference, Earley was asked by a reporter if
he was aware that one of his largest contributors, Thruport Tech-
nologies, was managing ads for a pornographic portal site called
Sex.com. 16 5 Earley, labeled as a Christian conservative, was un-
aware of the tenuous relationship between Thruport and the por-
nography industry and ultimately returned the contributions. 16
6
In 2005, the Republican nominee for attorney general, Robert
F. McDonnell, 167 received contributions totaling over one million
dollars from the Republican State Leadership Committee
("RSLC"), a political action committee based in Washington, D.C.
163. See VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-947.4(B) (Repl. Vol. 2006).
164. The 2001 Gubernatorial election in Virginia was between Mark L. Earley, a for-
mer Republican Virginia Senator and former Attorney General from Chesapeake, and
Mark Warner, a Democrat from Alexandria who had never previously held elected office.
Warner won the election by a count of 984,177 (52%) votes to 887,234 (46%) votes. See Vir-
ginia State Board of Elections, Election Results, Nov. 6, 2001, http://www.sbe.state.va.us/
web-docs/election/results/2001/nov200l/html/index.htm.
165. See Martin Kady II, Spat Over Online Porn a Moot Point, WASH. BUS. J., June 22,
2001, http://washington.bizjournals.com/washington/stories/2001/06/25/story2.html.
166. See id.
167. Robert F. McDonnell, a Republican and previous Delegate to the Virginia General
Assembly from Virginia Beach, defeated R. Creigh Deeds, a Democratic Senator from Hot
Springs, by a count of 970,886 to 970,563, or 323 votes out of 1.94 million votes cast. This
2005 statewide race for Attorney General of Virginia was the closest statewide race in
modern Virginia history. See Michael D. Shear, McDonnell Declared Attorney General;
State Board Finds 323-Vote Victory; Deeds Fights On, WASH. POST, Nov. 29, 2005, at B1.
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that contributes to candidates for state office. 168 McDonnell's
campaign disclosed, pursuant to Virginia law, that the contribu-
tions were made by the RSLC, but he was called on by his oppo-
nent and others to disclose whose contributions to the RSLC had
funded the contributions to his campaign.'69 At the time, under
both Virginia and federal law, the RSLC had no duty to disclose
its contributors to the Virginia Board of Elections. The only duty
of the RSLC was to disclose its contributors to the Internal Reve-
nue Service when it made its filings for fiscal year 2005 in the
spring of 2006-months after the November election. 170
The Virginia Board of Elections opined, to no avail, that the
Virginia committee for the RSLC had a duty to itemize those con-
tributions exceeding $100 and to report any contributions exceed-
ing $10,000 to the Board of Elections' website within three
days. 171
Mere months after the 2005 election, the Virginia General As-
sembly enacted the Campaign Finance Disclosure Act of 2006.172
The Act made few substantive amendments to Virginia campaign
finance law, save some penalty increases, but included a section
entitled: "Certain contributions received from federal political ac-
tion and out-of-state political committees; campaign committee
responsibilities." 173 The code section states in full:
Prior to accepting contributions of $10,000 or more in the aggregate
in any calendar year from any one federal political action committee
or out-of-state political committee, the candidate campaign commit-
tee shall (i) request the federal political action committee's or out-of-
state political committee's State Board of Elections registration
number from the committee and (ii) verify that number with the
State Board. 174
By ensuring that out-of-state or federal committees are regis-
tered with the State Board of Elections, the law assures that con-




172. Act of Apr. 19, 2006, ch. 892, 2006 Va. Acts 1469 (codified in scattered sections of
VA. CODE ANN. titles 2.2, 19.2, 24.2, and 30).
173. VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-947.3:1 (Repl. Vol. 2006).
174. Id.
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tributors to those committees will be disclosed to the State Board
of Elections.175
The refusal by the RSLC to disclose the identities of its con-
tributors could be seen as a detour from the historic commitment
of disclosure in Virginia. This isolated and largely unnoticed inci-
dent does not appear to indicate that more candidates in Virginia
will begin looking for loopholes in Virginia's disclosure require-
ments, but only time will tell. Additionally, the rapid response by
the Virginia General Assembly to close the loophole-within
months of it being exploited by the McDonnell campaign-
illustrates Virginia's commitment to an effective system based on
full disclosure.
V. VIRGINIA LAWS GOVERNING CAMPAIGN FINANCE
A. Full Disclosure
Virginia campaign finance law demands full disclosure by
those making and those receiving political contributions without
limiting the amount a contributor may contribute.
In Virginia, "any person, candidate campaign committee, or po-
litical committee that makes independent expenditures, in the
aggregate during an election cycle, of $1,000 or more for a state-
wide election or $500 or more for any other election shall main-
tain records and report" to the state Board of Elections.176 Addi-
tionally, "[a]ll contributions and expenditures received or made
by any candidate, or received or made on his behalf. . . shall be
paid over or delivered to the candidate's treasurer ... in such de-
tail . . . as to allow him" to make reports to the State Board of
Elections in compliance with the Virginia Code. 177
175. The new law governing out-of-state political committees assesses stiff fines on
committees that fail to register with the State Board. If an out-of-state political committee
contributes $10,000 in the aggregate in a calendar year to a campaign committee and fails
to register, it will be assessed a civil penalty equal to the amount of the contributions
made to a Virginia candidate's campaign committee. These same penalties are applicable
to both out-of-state political committees and federal political action committees, and are in
addition to any other penalties to which the committees may be subject under other por-
tions of the Act. See id. § 24.2-953.5 (Repl. Vol. 2006).
176. VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-945.2 (Supp. 2007).
177. Id. § 24.2-947.3(D) (Repl. Vol. 2006).
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The reports must contain "[t]he total number of contributors,
each of whom has contributed an aggregate of $100 or less, in-
cluding cash and in-kind contributions."'17' The reports also must
contain the name, amount, aggregate amount to date, and other
personal information for any contributor who has contributed
more than $100 in the aggregate to any one candidate. 179
Generally, "[a]ny person who violates, or aids, abets, or partici-
pates" in violating the reporting laws "shall be subject to a civil
penalty not to exceed $100. "1"° If a candidate's committee files its
report with the Board of Elections after the codified deadlines,18'
it will "be assessed a civil penalty not to exceed $500. ' ' 12 The can-
didate's committee will "be assessed a civil penalty of $1,000" for
a second or any subsequent late filing."3 If the committee files no
report at all, it "shall be assessed a civil penalty not to exceed
$500."1"4 Lastly, "[i]n the case of a second or any subsequent such
violation pertaining to our election cycle, the candidate campaign
committee or political committee shall be assessed a civil penalty,
of $1,000 for each such failure to file."8 5
In addition to the penalties just stated, any candidate for gov-
ernor, lieutenant governor, or attorney general who fails to file a
complete report by the given deadline, and who continues to be
delinquent after a seven-day grace period following notification of
delinquency in writing by the State Board of Elections, could be
assessed additional civil penalties of $500 for each day of delin-
quency.8 6 The statute holds the candidate and the candidate's
committee treasurer jointly and severally liable. 7
The Virginia statute that acts most like a campaign contribu-
tion restriction prohibits members of the General Assembly,
statewide officials, and campaign committees of General Assem-
bly members and statewide officials, from soliciting or accepting
contributions "on and after the first day of a regular session of the
178. Id. § 24.2-947.4(B)(1) (Repl. Vol. 2006).
179. See id. § 24.2-947.4(B)(2)(a)-(h) (Repl. Vol. 2006).
180. Id. § 24.2-953(C) (Repl. Vol. 2006).
181. See id. §§ 24.2-947.6 to -947.8 (Repl. Vol. 2006).
182. Id. § 24.2-953.2(B) (Repl. Vol. 2006).
183. Id.
184. Id. § 24.2-953.1(B) (Repl. Vol. 2006).
185. Id.
186. See id. § 24.2-953.4(A)-(C) (Repl. Vol. 2006).
187. Id. § 24.2-953.4(C) (Repl. Vol. 2006).
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General Assembly through adjournment sine die of that ses-
sion."' Additionally, "[n]o person or political committee shall
make or promise to make a contribution to a member of the Gen-
eral Assembly or statewide official" during a regular session of
the General Assembly.18 9 This restriction does not apply to con-
tributions made by a General Assembly member from his per-
sonal funds or contributions made to the campaign committee of a
candidate in a special election. 190
B. Virtues of the Virginia System of Full Disclosure
Virginia campaign finance laws, which rely almost wholly on
full disclosure, are simple, effective, and pose little threat to First
Amendment rights.
A system of full disclosure without restrictions is easier to ad-
minister than a more complex system because there are no loop-
holes to police or to close, and there are virtually no laws to cir-
cumvent. Participants in the political process can more readily
understand and comply with Virginia's more simplistic system
than with its more complex federal counterpart. The sheer size of
Virginia's body of law pales in comparison to the voluminous body
of statutory and common law that governs the funding of federal
campaigns.
As stated above, the laws currently in place in Virginia have
been effective at curbing apparent and actual corruption in the
context of campaign contributions.191 Conversely, at the federal
level-where restrictions abound-actual and apparent corrup-
tion steeped in campaign finance has recently been prominent.
Myriad grounds can be cited for the fact that Virginia confronts
less corruption in the campaign finance context. A romanticized
theory urges that Virginia operates under a prevailing ethic that
is more hostile to corruption than other states and the federal
government. At the opposite end of the spectrum, a cynical theory
advocates that corruption cases are fewer in Virginia because en-
forcement is more relaxed.
188. Id. § 24.2-954(A) (Repl. Vol. 2006).
189. Id. § 24.2-954(B) (Repl. Vol. 2006).
190. Id. § 24.2-954(C) (Repl. Vol. 2006).
191. See supra Part IV.
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Another factor keeping corruption at bay may be the public
support for Virginia's system of full disclosure. For example, the
Virginia Public Access Project ("VPAP") is a non-partisan, non-
profit organization that maintains an internet database of Vir-
ginia campaign finance disclosure information. 192 Founded in
1997, VPAP has made campaign contributions and expenditures
information publicly accessible. This information has armed peo-
ple with the knowledge of who is contributing to whom, making
the funding of Virginia campaigns transparent and curbing ac-
tual and apparent corruption. 193 VPAP is funded with donations
from private organizations that support full disclosure as a
means to regulate campaign finance.194 VPAP exposes the cam-
paign finance information disclosed by candidates to empower
voters to consider that information before casting their votes.
Many complex and interwoven factors undoubtedly account for
Virginia's greater success in preventing corruption in the context
of campaign finance. While these factors may be too varied and
complicated to fully discern, the fact remains that in comparison
to its federal counterpart, Virginia's political landscape enjoys a
history less scarred by campaign finance scandals. History shows
that the Virginia system is more effective at curbing corruption
than the federal system.
Finally, a system primarily based on full disclosure does not of-
fend the First Amendment rights of political participants. With
the exception of disallowing elected officials to solicit or accept
contributions during the General Assembly session, 9 ' Virginia
campaign finance law places no limits on persons who wish to en-
gage in the political process. While Congress and the Supreme
Court have repeatedly stated that federal restrictions on cam-
paign contributions infringe on First Amendment rights, the fed-
eral government's interest in curbing actual and apparent corrup-
tion has taken precedence.
Under Virginia's system, however, such infringement does not
occur. Virginia's system of full disclosure is a more democratic
192. Virginia Public Access Project, www.vpap.org (last visited Oct. 19, 2007).
193. Virginia Public Access Project, About VPAP, www.vpap.org/vpap/about.cfm (last
visited Oct. 19, 2007).
194. Virginia Public Access Project, Friends of Public Access, www.vpap.org/vpap/
sponsors.cfm (last visited Oct. 19, 2007).
195. See VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-954(A) (Repl. Vol. 2006).
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system than the federal government's-instead of limiting contri-
butions and participation in the process, it informs voters from
where candidates are receiving contributions. The Virginia sys-
tem empowers the voter to decide for himself if actual or apparent
corruption is present, and it compels the voter to use this infor-
mation to decide whether the candidate is worthy of the voter's
support.
The Virginia system of campaign finance law, which relies al-
most wholly on disclosure, has been effective at curbing actual
and apparent corruption in the funding of state campaigns with-
out infringing on the First Amendment rights of Virginians.
VI. THE NEED FOR REFORM
The federal system of statutory and common law that currently
governs campaign finance needs immediate reform. The complex-
ity of the current system makes it extremely difficult for partici-
pants in the political process to understand and comply with its
demands. The system has been ineffective at curbing the corrup-
tion, grounded in campaign finance, that exists in the federal sys-
tem. The Abramoff scandal, other recent scandals, and the man-
ner in which business is done has created a culture of apparent
and actual corruption in Washington, D.C. Finally, the First
Amendment infringement inherent in the current system must
give way to a system that does not infringe, but instead encour-
ages citizens to use their constitutional rights to become im-
mersed in the political process.
Virginia's system of full disclosure provides a tempting alterna-
tive to the current federal scheme-it is simple, effective, and
does not infringe on the First Amendment rights of Virginians.
However, reining in the apparent and actual corruption now oc-
curring at the federal level will require more than a system of
wholesale disclosure. For instance, Virginia's system of full dis-
closure would not have stopped any of the apparent or actual cor-
ruption, cited above, that has plagued the federal system in re-
cent years. Jack Abramoff could have engaged in the same, or
perhaps worse, practices had he been operating under a system
that did not restrict contributions but merely required full disclo-
sure. For these reasons, this commentary proposes novel legisla-
tive reform which relies on Virginia's system of full disclosure,
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but that goes further to curb actual and apparent corruption in
the funding of federal campaigns.
VII. THE CARSON ACT
A. Overview
The remainder of this commentary proposes an alternative to
the scheme that currently governs campaign finance at the fed-
eral level. The Corruption Abatement Reform Statute of Neces-
sity ("CARSON Act" or the "Act"),'96 builds on Virginia's system of
full disclosure to provide a body of law that would more simply
and more effectively curb actual and apparent corruption
grounded in campaign finance without infringing on the First
Amendment rights of Americans. 1
9 7
The statutory and judicial approaches historically employed to
curb actual or apparent corruption in federal campaigns have re-
mained largely because they attempt to repress the actual or ap-
parent corruption from the wrong angle-by attempting to limit
the amount that may be contributed by the contributor. The
CARSON Act provides a different approach, which could cut
down on the actual and apparent corruption associated with cam-
paign finance by focusing not on what the contributor may give to
196. The CARSON Act invokes the memory of William E. Carson (1870-1942). Carson
was the manager of Harry F. Byrd's 1925 campaign for Governor of Virginia. Carson was
responsible for the fundraising campaign that would lead to Byrd's victory, and to the
creation of the most prominent political machine in Virginia history. Carson was also re-
sponsible for establishing the Shenandoah National Park and Virginia's Skyline Drive
through his efforts in lobbying the state government, the federal government, and by lead-
ing a fundraising drive that raised more than two million dollars from private contributors
during the Great Depression. For more on William E. Carson, perhaps the most prolific
fundraiser in Virginia history, see American Academy for Park and Recreation Admin.,
Pugsley Award Recipients, William E. Carson, http://www.rpts.tamu.edupugsley/Carson.
htm (last visited Sept. 23, 2007).
197. While historically the Commonwealth of Virginia and the federal government
have not always worked well together, the hope is that by building on Virginia's campaign
finance laws, the CARSON Act will provide much needed reform at the federal level. See,
e.g., United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1408 (W.D. Va. 1991) (holding that the
Virginia Military Institute's policy of refusing to admit females did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). ("It was in May of 1864 that the United
States and the Virginia Military Institute (VMI) first confronted each other. That was a
life-and-death engagement that occurred on the battlefield at New Market, Virginia. The
combatants have again confronted each other, but this time the venue is in this court.
Nonetheless, VMI claims the struggle is nothing short of life-and-death confrontation-
albeit figurative.").
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the candidate or elected official, but on what the elected official
may give to the contributor.
Generally, the Act allows a candidate to accept contributions of
any amount while requiring him to report all contributions he re-
ceives. However, the Act disqualifies him from debates or votes on
issues in which a qualified contributor-one that has contributed
to him above a given threshold in any election cycle-has an in-
terest. The CARSON Act would "addresses the influence of
money, rather than money itself."9 '
The CARSON Act also builds on the laws already at work in
Virginia by requiring campaign committees to fully disclose in-
formation concerning contributions and expenditures, and by pe-
nalizing those committees that do not fully disclose. The
CARSON Act goes further than the current Virginia laws by re-
quiring contributors to disclose more information to the candidate
campaign committees, and by subjecting contributors, candidates,
and elected officials to penalties for failing to comply with the Act.
Thus, the CARSON Act provides a sound alternative to current
federal law because it is less complex, more effective at curbing
actual or apparent corruption, and does not infringe on First
Amendment rights.
B. Text of the CARSON Act
The text of the proposed reform measure is terse considering
its far-reaching effects. The CARSON Act reads: "No elected fed-
eral official, in his official capacity, may consider any issue in
which any qualified contributor has an interest."
C. Definitions of Terms in the CARSON Act
Clearly, the text of the CARSON Act is full of terms requiring
definition.
A qualified contributor is a contributor that has made a contri-
bution in excess of $1,000 to that elected federal official during
any single election cycle in which the elected federal official was a
candidate for Congress, or a contribution in excess of $10,000 to
that elected federal official during any single election cycle in
198. Nagle, supra note 3, at 103.
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which the elected federal official was a candidate for President or
Vice President.
Under the Act, an individual is never considered a qualified
contributor, no matter the size of his contribution; individuals can
contribute to any elected federal official in any amount without
recourse under the Act. The Act requires full disclosure by both
the individual and elected federal official. Additionally, under the
Act no individual can make a contribution or expenditure on be-
half of another individual or a qualified contributor.
An elected federal official refers to any member of Congress,
the Vice President, and the President. The phrase in his official
capacity refers to any action taken by an elected federal official
when acting not as a citizen, but as an elected federal official.
The phrase, consider any issue, is defined by borrowing lan-
guage from the portion of the Virginia Code which concerns the
registration and regulation of lobbyists. Considerfing] any issue
encompasses all executive action and legislative action. Executive
action includes: "the proposal, drafting, development, considera-
tion, amendment, adoption, approval, promulgation, issuance,
modification, rejection, or postponement by an executive agency
or official of legislation or executive orders issued by the Presi-
dent."'9 9 Executive action also would include the drafting of regu-
lations and all appointments to boards, commissions, or any other
posts to which the President has the authority to make appoint-
ments. Legislative action, also based on the Virginia Code, would
include:
Preparation, research, drafting, introduction, consideration, modifi-
cation, amendment, approval, passage, enactment, tabling, post-
ponement, defeat, or rejection of a bill, resolution, amendment, mo-
tion, report, nomination, appointment, or other matter by Congress
or a legislative official. Action by the President in approving, vetoing,
or recommending amendments for a bill passed by Congress; or ac-
tion by Congress in overriding or sustaining a veto by the President,
considering amendments recommended by the President, or consid-
ering, confirming, or rejecting an appointment of the President. 200
199. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-419 (Cum. Supp. 2007).
200. Cf. id.
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In addition to its ban on elected federal officials considerfing]
any issue in which a qualified contributor has an interest, the
CARSON Act also proscribes an elected federal official from dis-
cussing or debating proposed legislation in which a qualified con-
tributor has an interest.
Under the Act, the term interest is defined by borrowing verbi-
age from the definition of "personal interest in a transaction" codi-
fied in the Virginia General Assembly Conflicts of Interests Act
("GACIA"). 2 1 Under the CARSON Act:
A qualified contributor shall have an interest when the qualified con-
tributor's association, association member, association constituent,
corporation, corporation officer, corporation employee, or family
member of a corporation officer or employee, corporation subsidiary
officer, corporation subsidiary employee, or family member of a cor-
poration subsidiary officer or employee, clients, contributors, or when
the qualified contributor itself has a "special interest" in property or
a business, or represents an individual or business and such prop-
erty, business or represented individual or business (i) is the subject
of the consideration of the issue or (ii) may realize a reasonably fore-
seeable direct or indirect benefit or detriment as a result of the con-
sideration of the issue by the elected federal official.
The qualified contributor will have "special interest" in an issue only
if the qualified contributor or an individual or business represented
by the qualified contributor is affected in a way that is substantially
different from the general public. 202
The CARSON Act, once again borrowing verbiage from GACIA,
defines special interest as:
[A] financial benefit or liability accruing to a qualified contributor
• .. Such interest shall exist by reason of (i) ownership in a business
if the ownership interest exceeds three percent of the total equity of
the business; (ii) annual income that exceeds, or may reasonably be
anticipated to exceed, $10,000 from ownership in real or personal
property or a business; (iii) salary, other compensation, fringe bene-
fits, or benefits from the use of property, or any combination thereof,
paid or provided by a business that exceeds, or may reasonably be
anticipated to exceed, $10,000 annually; (iv) ownership of real or
personal property if the interest exceeds $10,000 in value and ex-
cluding ownership in a business, income, or salary, other compensa-
tion, fringe benefits or benefits from the use of property; or (v) per-
201. See id. § 30-101 (Repl. Vol. 2004).




sonal liability incurred or assumed on behalf of a business if the li-
ability exceeds three percent of the asset value of the business. 
203
The Act borrows language from the Virginia Campaign Finance
Disclosure Act of 2006 ("CFDA") to define contribution:
Contribution means money and services of any amount, in-kind con-
tributions, and any other thing of value, given, advanced, loaned, or
in any other way provided directly to a federal candidate's campaign
committee for the purpose of influencing the outcome of a federal
election or defraying the costs of the inauguration of a President or
Vice President. "Contribution" includes expenditures made on behalf
of a federal candidate when coordination with the federal candidate
does not occur. "Contribution" also includes expenditures made on
behalf of a federal candidate when coordination with the federal can-
didate does occur. 204
In referencing a single election cycle, the CARSON Act employs
the same time frame as the CFDA:
The candidate's election cycle shall be deemed to begin on January 1
of the year that the candidate first seeks election for the office
through December 31 immediately following the election for such of-
fice. The next election cycle, and any subsequent election cycles, for
the candidate who seeks election for successive terms in the same of-
fice shall begin on January 1 immediately following each election for
the same office and continue through December 31 immediately fol-
lowing the next successive election for the same office. 205
It is important to note, however, that the CARSON Act applies
to the relationship between an elected federal official and any
qualified contributor who has ever contributed more than the
threshold amount in any federal election cycle in which the
elected federal official was either a candidate for Congress, Presi-
dent, or Vice President, regardless of whether the (now) elected
federal official was the winner of the previous election or how
long ago that election occurred. If an elected federal official was
ever a candidate for state office before seeking federal office, the
CARSON Act does not consider contributions made to the elected
federal official by an otherwise qualified contributor in any state
campaign.
203. Cf. id.
204. Cf. id. § 24.2-945.1 (Repl. Vol. 2006).
205. Cf. id. § 24.2-947 (Repl. Vol. 2006).
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Under the CARSON Act, any qualified contributor or individ-
ual can make expenditures on behalf of any elected federal official
without those expenditures preventing the elected federal official
from considering an issue in which the qualified contributor has
an interest. However,. as made evident in the CARSON Act's defi-
nition of expenditure below, the Act prohibits coordination be-
tween any elected federal official and any contributor that makes
expenditures on his behalf; an expenditure must be made inde-
pendent of any coordination with the elected federal official, or
the expenditure is deemed a contribution. If uncoordinated expen-
ditures made on behalf of elected federal officials could work to
prevent an elected federal official from considering an issue in
which the spender has an interest.
Furthermore, the CARSON Act demands that expenditures
made on behalf of a candidate by a qualified contributor or indi-
vidual, like contributions, be disclosed to the FEC when the ex-
penditure is in excess of $100. The CARSON Act relies heavily on
the CFDA to define expenditure:
Money and services of any amount, and any other thing of value over
$100, paid, promised, loaned, provided, or in any other way dis-
bursed by any candidate, qualified contributor, or individual for the
purpose of influencing the outcome of an election for Congress, Presi-
dent, or Vice President, without the coordination of that candidate,
or defraying the costs of the inauguration of a President or Vice
President. 2u6
The CARSON Act also relies on the CFDA to define coordination:
Coordinated or coordination refers to an expenditure that is made (i)
at the express request or suggestion of a candidate, a candidate's
campaign committee, or an agent of the candidate or his campaign
committee or (ii) with material involvement of the candidate, a can-
didate's campaign committee, or an agent of the candidate or his
campaign committee in devising the strategy, content, means of dis-
semination, or timing of the expenditure. 
207
Additionally, the CARSON Act demands that the qualified con-
tributor disclose to the FEC all the contributions in excess of $100
made to it, whether from an individual or from another qualified
contributor. Contributions made to a qualified contributor are de-
fined the same way as contributions made directly to a candidate,




and disclosed to the FEC in the same manner as a candidate dis-
closes the contributions he receives. For example, if the Republi-
can National Committee ("RNC") receives a contribution in excess
of $100 from the National Rifle Association ("NRA"), the RNC
must disclose that contribution to the FEC.
It is important to note that by definition, under the CARSON
Act, an elected federal official is prevented from considering an is-
sue in which a qualified contributor has an interest if that quali-
fied contributor were to contribute in excess of $1,000 to another
qualified contributor who ultimately contributes in excess of
$1,000 to that elected federal official in any single election cycle.
In the example used above, if the NRA contributed $2,000 to the
RNC, and the RNC contributed $2,000 to a candidate in the same
election cycle, once elected, the federal official would be ineligible
to consider any issue in which the NRA has an interest.
D. Personal Interest
The CARSON Act requires elected federal officials to disclose
their personal interests, as required by GACIA.2 °' The CARSON
Act also follows Virginia law in proscribing elected federal offi-
cials from voting on issues in which they have a personal inter-
est.2 °9 However, elected federal officials maintain the ability to
discuss or debate issues in which they have a personal interest as
long as they verbally disclose their interests before the discussion
commences:
An elected federal official who has a personal interest in an issue
shall disqualify himself from considering the issue. This disqualifica-
tion shall not prevent an elected federal official from participating in
discussions and debates, provided (i) he verbally discloses the fact of
his personal interest in the issue at the outset of the discussion or
debate or as soon as practicable thereafter and (ii) he does not vote
on the issue in which he has a personal interest. 210
E. Qualified Contributor Interest
As outlined above, the CARSON Act prevents an elected federal
official from considering an issue in which a qualified contributor
208. See id. § 30-110 (Repl. Vol. 2004 & Cum. Supp. 2007).
209. See id. § 30-108 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
210. Cf id. (emphasis added).
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has an interest; this proscribes discussing, debating, and voting
on that issue. In effect, the CARSON Act is more restrictive in
governing the consideration by an elected federal official of an is-
sue in which a qualified contributor has an interest than of issues
in which the elected federal official himself has a personal inter-
est.
The rationale behind this distinction is that an elected federal
official should be allowed to discuss or debate issues in which he
has a personal interest because all involved will know he is per-
sonally interested, per his verbal declaration, and because other
elected federal officials may depend on his knowledge of the issue.
However, if an elected federal official is allowed to discuss or de-
bate issues in which a qualified contributor is interested, even if
the official must verbally declare his association, the official
would be free to influence his fellow officials on behalf of the
qualified contributor. This is the type of activity that the
CARSON Act is specifically designed to prohibit. Ending this type
of activity would go far in curbing the actual and apparent cor-
ruption associated with campaign contributions made to elected
federal officials.
F. Greater Disclosure Under the CARSON Act
The CARSON Act requires a greater level of disclosure than
the CFDA. The CARSON Act requires all contributors to disclose
more information, accurately and timely, to the treasurer of the
campaign committee who receives their contribution when the
contribution exceeds $100 per election cycle. Borrowing from the
CFDA, the CARSON Act defines campaign committee as "the
committee designated by a candidate to receive all contributions
and make all expenditures for him or on his behalf in connection
with his nomination or election." 211
The CARSON Act requires qualified contributors to disclose
more information to the campaign committee treasurer than in-
dividual contributors. Treasurers are required to file disclosure
reports, accurately and timely, with the FEC, and are required to
include the additional information required from the contributors.
A copy of the report the treasurer files with the FEC, containing
all the disclosed information, would be retained by the elected
211. Cf id. § 24.2-945.1 (Repl. Vol. 2006).
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federal official and used by him to determine what issues he may
consider once elected.
1. Qualified Contributor Disclosure
The CARSON Act requires every qualified contributor that
makes a contribution in excess of $100 to a campaign committee
in a single election cycle to make a disclosure to the treasurer of
that campaign committee within ten days of making the contribu-
tion. The disclosure should include: the name, business address,
and telephone number of the qualified contributor; the names,
business addresses, and telephone numbers of all subsidiaries of
that qualified contributor along with a brief description of the
types of activities performed by that qualified contributor and its
subsidiaries; the name, business address, and telephone number
of any lobbyists for that qualified contributor along with an iden-
tification of the subject matter about which the lobbyists will en-
gage in lobbying; the names, business addresses, and telephone
numbers of any entity that is represented by the qualified con-
tributor along with a brief description of the type of business per-
formed by each of those entities.
The same disclosures should be made by a qualified contribu-
tor, within ten days, when it makes an uncoordinated expendi-
ture on behalf of a federal candidate in excess of $100, but the
disclosure should be made to the FEC, not the treasurer of the
campaign committee of the candidate.
2. Individual Disclosure
Following the language of the CFDA, any individual who con-
tributes more than $100 to a campaign committee in a single elec-
tion cycle is required to make a disclosure to the treasurer of that
campaign committee within ten days of making the contribu-
tion.212 The disclosure should contain: the name of the contribu-
tor, his mailing address, the amount of his contribution, the ag-
gregate amount of contributions he has made to date, the date of
his contribution, the name of his employer or principal business,
212. Cf. id. § 24.2-947.4(B)(2) (Repl. Vol. 2006).
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and the city and state where he is employed or where his busi-
ness is located.213
The same disclosures should be made by an individual, within
ten days, when he makes an uncoordinated expenditure on behalf
of a federal candidate in excess of $100, but the disclosure should
be made to the FEC, not the treasurer of the campaign committee
of the candidate.
3. Failure of Elected Federal Officials to Disclose
The penalties codified in the CFDA, as outlined in Part V.A
above, are also employed by the CARSON Act.214 Under the
CARSON Act, those penalties are levied against federal candi-
dates or elected federal officials when they fail to file campaign fi-
nance disclosure reports with the FEC in an accurate and timely
manner.
4. Failure of Contributors to Disclose
Borrowing language from the CFDA applicable to candi-
dates,215 the CARSON Act extends those penalties to contributors
when they fail to make accurate and timely disclosures to the
campaign committees to which they contribute more than $100,
or to the FEC upon making an uncoordinated expenditure in ex-
cess of $100.
Any contributor that violates, aids, abets, or participates in vio-
lating the reporting laws shall be subject to a civil penalty not to
exceed $100. However, if a contributor fails to file a complete re-
port within ten days after making a contribution of more than
$100, a contribution that causes its aggregate contribution for
that election cycle to exceed $100, an uncoordinated expenditure
of more than $100, or an uncoordinated expenditure that causes
its aggregate uncoordinated expenditures for that election cycle to
exceed $100, the contributor will be subject to a civil penalty not
to exceed $500. If the contributor files no report at all by the
given deadline, it will be assessed a civil penalty not to exceed
$500 for each failure to file. Willful violators of the disclosure
213. Cf id. § 24.2-947.4(B)(2)(a)-(h) (Repl. Vol. 2006).




laws will be guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor. Additionally, any
contributor that fails to file a complete report by the given dead-
line, and that continues to be delinquent after a seven-day grace
period following notification of delinquency in writing by the cam-
paign committee treasurer or the FEC, may be assessed an addi-
tional civil penalty. The civil penalty would be an additional $500
assessed for all subsequent delinquent days after the seven-day
grace period, and would hold the contributor solely liable.
G. Knowing Violation by an Elected Federal Official
The portion of the CARSON Act proscribing an elected federal
official from considering an issue in which a qualified contributor
has an interest is self-policing. It is the responsibility of the
elected federal official to maintain records of every qualified con-
tributor who has contributed in excess of $1,000 to his campaign
committee during any single election cycle in which the elected
federal official was a candidate for Congress, or in excess of
$10,000 during any single election cycle in which the elected fed-
eral official was a candidate for President or Vice President. The
elected federal official could compile such a list by retaining copies
of the campaign contribution disclosure reports that his treasurer
files with the FEC. These reports would reveal to the elected fed-
eral official the issues in which a qualified contributor has an in-
terest and would therefore indicate the issues that the elected fed-
eral official would be barred from considering.
1. Penalties
If an elected federal official knowingly violates the provisions of
the CARSON Act, he is subject to criminal penalties. The Act bor-
rows liberally from the Virginia State and Local Government
Conflict [sic] of Interests Act in establishing how a knowing viola-
tion is penalized.216 Under the CARSON Act, there is a rebuttable
presumption that any violation by an elected federal official is a
knowing violation. The underlying rationale here is that the dis-
closure reports filed with the FEC by the treasurer of the elected
federal official's campaign committee should reveal to him the is-
sues in which qualified contributors have an interest. A knowing
violation under the CARSON Act would be one in which the
216. See id. §§ 2.2.3120-3124 (Repl. Vol. 2005).
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elected federal official engages in conduct, performs an act, or re-
fuses to perform an act when he knows that conduct is prohibited
or required by the CARSON Act. The elected federal official would
have the burden of providing clear and convincing evidence to re-
but the presumption that he knowingly violated the Act; if suc-
cessful, the elected federal official would not be penalized.
Any elected federal official who knowingly violates any provi-
sion of the CARSON Act is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor. Ad-
ditionally, any elected federal official who knowingly violates any
provision of the Act is guilty of malfeasance in office or employ-
ment. Upon conviction thereof, the judge or jury trying the case,
in addition to any other fine or penalty provided by law, may or-
der the forfeiture of such office or employment.217 In addition to
any other penalty or fine provided by law, when the elected fed-
eral official has been convicted of knowingly considering an issue
in which a qualified contributor has an interest, the elected fed-
eral official becomes liable for a civil penalty of an amount three
times the value of the contribution made by the qualified con-
tributor in any election cycle.
The statute of limitations for the criminal prosecution of an
elected federal official for violation of any provision of the
CARSON Act is five years from the time the violation is discov-
ered, or ten years from the date of the violation, whichever occurs
first. Any prosecution for malfeasance in office is governed by the
statute of limitations provided by law.21
2. Enforcement
The powers of enforcing the Act are delegated to and carried
out by the FEC. Any U.S. citizen may file a written complaint
with the FEC claiming a violation of the CARSON Act. In addi-
tion to any other powers and duties prescribed by law, the FEC
has additional powers and duties under the CARSON Act to ad-
vise elected federal officials on appropriate procedures for comply-
ing with the Act. The FEC may review any disclosure statements,
without notice to the elected federal official, for the purpose of de-
termining satisfactory compliance, and will investigate matters
that come to its attention that reflect possible violations of the
217. Cf id. § 2.2-3122 (Repl. Vol. 2005).
218. Cf id. § 2.2-3125 (Repl. Vol. 2005).
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Act. If the FEC determines that there is a reasonable basis to
conclude that the elected federal official has knowingly violated
any provision of the CARSON Act, the FEC will turn the matter
over to the Office of the United States Attorney for the District of
Columbia. The U.S. Attorney's Office will have complete and in-
dependent discretion to prosecute the elected federal official.
3. Advisory Opinions
The FEC may render advisory opinions to any elected federal
official who seeks advice as to whether the facts in a particular
case would constitute a violation of the provisions of the CARSON
Act. The FEC will determine which opinions or portions thereof
are of general interest to the public and may, from time to time,
be published. Irrespective of whether an FEC opinion has been
requested and rendered, any elected federal official has the right
to seek a declaratory judgment or other judicial relief as provided
by law. An elected federal official will not be prosecuted for a
knowing violation of the CARSON Act if the alleged violation re-
sulted from his good faith reliance on a written opinion of the
FEC, provided that the opinion was issued after a full disclosure
of the facts.219
VIII. THE BENEFITS OF THE CARSON ACT
Though based on current Virginia law and developed and ex-
plored in the context of the Virginia political system, the
CARSON Act could be employed at the federal level as a sound
alternative to the current body of federal campaign finance law.
The CARSON Act would be less complex than current federal
campaign finance law, more effective at curbing the actual and
apparent corruption that exists in the financing of federal cam-
paigns, and would not infringe on the First Amendment rights of
individual Americans.
The CARSON Act would be easier to understand than the cur-
rent body of federal campaign finance law. Any portions of the
CARSON Act that are arguably complex or confusing would deal
merely with the definitions of terms in the Act or the administra-
219. Cf. id. § 2.2-3121 (Repl. Vol. 2005).
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tion of the Act. Unlike current federal campaign finance law,
however, the requirements of the CARSON Act would be clear: if
a qualified (non-individual) contributor has ever contributed more
than $1,000 to an elected federal official in any single election cy-
cle in which the elected federal official was a candidate for Con-
gress, or $10,000 in any single election cycle in which the elected
federal official was a candidate for President or Vice President,
that elected federal official cannot discuss, debate, or vote on is-
sues in which that qualified contributor has an interest. An indi-
vidual seeking office for the first time could more readily compre-
hend and comply with the CARSON Act than with the current
body of federal campaign finance law.
The CARSON Act would also be much more effective at curbing
actual and apparent corruption in the financing of campaigns
than current federal law. Corruption can mean many things to
many people, but most who feel actual or apparent corruption ex-
ists in the context of campaign contributions find that it exists in
the relationship between non-individual contributors and elected
officials. By preventing elected officials from considering issues in
which qualified (non-individual) contributors have an interest,
the CARSON Act seeks to neutralize most of the inherent corrup-
tion that might exist in such relationships.
As discussed in Part I.B above, the Supreme Court has recog-
nized that, in the context of campaign finance, corruption essen-
tially exists in three forms: "quid pro quo, monetary influence,
and distortion."22 ° When an elected official is barred from consid-
ering issues in which a qualified contributor has an interest, it is
difficult for that contributor to receive a quid pro quo, to influence
an elected official with a monetary contribution, or to distort the
political process with the contribution.
Unlike current federal law, the CARSON Act would not in-
fringe on the First Amendment rights of individual contributors.
While the Supreme Court in Buckley and McConnell found that
contribution limits infringe on First Amendment rights, albeit
constitutionally, the Buckley Court found "no constitutional in-
firmities in the recordkeeping, reporting, and disclosure provi-
sions" that are still embodied in federal law.221 The Buckley Court
220. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
221. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 84 (1976).
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commented that disclosure requirements do have "the potential
for substantially infringing the exercise of First Amendment
rights," but the Court stopped short of finding such infringe-
ment.222 By not limiting individual contributions in any way, but
by merely requiring candidates, elected federal officials, and con-
tributors to fully disclose information about contributions re-
ceived and expenditures made, the CARSON Act would not in-
fringe on the First Amendment rights of individual contributors.
Similarly, by not expressly limiting contributions of qualified con-
tributors, but by merely requiring candidates, elected federal offi-
cials, and contributors to disclose information about contributions
received and expenditures made, the CARSON Act would not in-
fringe on the First Amendment rights of qualified contributors.
In addition to making campaign finance law simpler, more ef-
fective, and less offensive to constitutional rights, the CARSON
Act would make other improvements to current federal law. With-
out expressly limiting contributions, the Act would certainly have
a chilling effect on contributions from non-individuals. Under the
Act, qualified contributors would be less generous with their con-
tributions because, by contributing, they would effectively be ty-
ing the hands of the elected officials.
However, by placing no restrictions whatsoever on individual
contributions, the Act provides individuals with the option of be-
coming more engaged in the political process than current law al-
lows. That is, individuals may employ their contributions to
speak as loudly and freely as they desire in support of the federal
issues and candidates they support.
The intent of the CARSON Act is to set forth no express re-
striction on contributions of any kind by any type of contributor.
While the Act may have the unintended effect of discouraging
contributions by qualified contributors, the hope is that the Act
would have the intended effect of encouraging greater contribu-
tions and greater political involvement from individual contribu-
tors.2 23
222. Id. at 66.
223. See George F. Will, Editorial, Second Thoughts About Soft Money, WASH. POST,
Mar. 8, 2001, at A21 ("Arguments for more regulation of political speech are fueled by hy-
perbole about supposed 'torrents' of money pouring into politics. Such hyperbole probably
has been heard ever since George Washington, at age 25, first ran for the Virginia House
of Burgesses in 1757, spending 39 pounds for 160 gallons of rum and other beverages for
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Under current law, the federal candidate who convinces the
most individual contributors to contribute up to $2,300 in an elec-
tion cycle will raise the most money in that election cycle from in-
dividual contributors. The current federal scheme, therefore, dis-
advantages candidates who could solicit greater contributions
from wealthier individual contributors. By placing no express re-
striction on contributions from any source, and instead restricting
the action of all elected federal officials to the same degree after
they have received those contributions, the CARSON Act gives no
candidate a fundraising advantage. Candidates would be free to
solicit and accept, and contributors would be free to contribute, at
any level.
By not placing limits on contributions, the CARSON Act could
also have the effect of saving candidates and elected federal offi-
cials time in fundraising. That is, candidates and elected federal
officials would have the option of funding their campaigns with
fewer large contributions, from individuals or other entities, as
opposed to spending time soliciting many smaller contributions
subject to the current limits.
If the Act does have a chilling effect on contributions from non-
individuals, then the Act would change the very manner in which
candidates compete for public office in America. The cost of seek-
ing office would seemingly decrease, meaning that more partici-
pants could be drawn to the task. Campaigns would have to be
more strategic, more creative, and more cost effective in dissemi-
nating their campaign messages. Presumably more elections
would turn on the strength of a candidate's message as opposed to
his ability to garner the greatest contributions and his craftiness
in employing those contributions to control the airwaves.
The development of a thoughtful fundraising strategy by can-
didates and qualified contributors would be another welcomed ef-
fect of the Act. If a qualified contributor wants a candidate, once
the 391 eligible voters-more than a quart of drink, at a cost of (in today's currency) $2 per
voter. However, since the Voting Rights Act (1965) and the 26th Amendment (1971)
greatly expanded the electorate, spending per eligible voter in congressional races, in to-
day's dollars, has hovered in a range from approximately $2.50 to $3.50 per eligible voter,
inching up slightly in the highly competitive elections of 1994 and 1996 and reaching ap-
proximately $4 in the competitive elections of 1998-a bit more than the cost of one video
rental. If spending in the two-year 1999-2000 cycle for all candidates for all offices-
federal, state and local-reached the "obscene" (as critics call it) total of $3 billion, that
was $15 per eligible voter. And $3 billion-$2 billion less than Americans spend annually
on Halloween snacks-is five-one-hundredths of one percent of GDP.").
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elected, to have the ability to consider issues in which it has an
interest, then the contributor cannot contribute more than $1,000
or $10,000 to that candidate. On the other hand, if a candidate,
once elected, wants to reserve the right to consider issues in
which a qualified contributor has an interest, the candidate must
refuse contributions from that contributor in excess of $1,000 or
$10,000. Such decisions made by qualified contributors and can-
didates would need to be balanced against the candidate's need
for those contributions to secure victory. If the candidate does not
have the contributions that he must have to win, the types of is-
sues that he is legally allowed to consider, once elected, make no
difference. In this way, the CARSON Act would work to curb ac-
tual and apparent corruption in two contexts: during campaign
season leading up to election day and after election day when the
governing starts.
An additional attribute of the CARSON Act is the cover it can
provide for elected officials. The norm seems to be that contribu-
tors contribute to a candidate, not because they necessarily ex-
pect something in return, but because they see the candidate as
one who furthers their political beliefs. However, instances obvi-
ously exist where contributors make contributions with the ex-
pectation that they will receive something in return from the
elected official. Under the CARSON Act, the elected federal offi-
cial may accept contributions at any level he chooses. However, if
a qualified contributor expects special consideration or a political
payback from the elected federal official, the elected federal offi-
cial can cite the CARSON Act as his affirmative defense for pro-
viding no such special treatment.
In this situation, it seems less likely that the qualified con-
tributor would hold the inaction of the elected federal official
against him-the qualified contributor would know that the
elected federal official must obey the charge of the law. The quali-
fied contributor may contribute at a lower level, or ultimately
cease contributing, upon realizing that it can receive no special
consideration from the elected federal official in spite of the con-
tribution. Furthermore, once the qualified contributor contributes
above the threshold, the elected federal official becomes barred
from considering an issue in which that qualified contributor has
an interest. While this may damage the ability of the candidate or
elected federal official to solicit contributions, it would have the
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effect of driving the most corrupt players out of the game almost
immediately.
Another advantage of the CARSON Act would be its leveling of
the playing field for special interests. A special interest cannot
contribute at a high level to a candidate or an elected federal offi-
cial if the special interest ultimately wants the official in its cor-
ner. Likewise, a candidate or elected federal official cannot accept
a contribution over $1,000 if he desires to ultimately advocate for
that special interest once elected. This dilemma gives under-
funded special interests the chance to compete with their well-
heeled cohorts. By either removing large contributions made by a
special interest or the elected officials' ability to act on behalf of
that special interest, the real contest in the federal government
would no longer be over which interest can write the biggest
check. Instead, the contest would be based on ideas, and some of
the favor that elected federal officials have for affluent special in-
terests could be replaced with concern for less affluent special in-
terests or individual constituents.
By attempting to directly govern the interaction between quali-
fied contributors and elected federal officials, the CARSON Act
could do away with many of the rules and regulations that exist
in the current system. If elected federal officials are barred from
acting on behalf of qualified contributors, rules and regulations
that attempt to anticipate every scenario that may lead to appar-
ent or actual corruption in the federal government become unnec-
essary.
While qualified contributors would not be eligible to simultane-
ously contribute to and be represented by an elected federal offi-
cial under the Act, they would be eligible to make unsolicited, un-
coordinated, and fully disclosed expenditures on behalf of an
elected federal official. This policy goes along with the Act's spirit
of encouraging political expression and abolishes the prohibition,
under current law, of certain entities making expenditures or
paying for advertisements as a way of supporting the election of
federal candidates. Furthermore, these expenditures do not pre-
vent the ultimate elected federal official from considering issues
in which the qualified contributor has an interest.
As previously stated, because the Act allows qualified contribu-
tors to make uncoordinated expenditures on behalf of candidates,
the Act must not allow such expenditures to prevent federal
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elected officials from considering issues in which the entity mak-
ing those expenditures has an interest. If disqualification did oc-
cur based on such expenditures, a qualified contributor could be
compelled to make an expenditure on behalf of a candidate with
which it disagrees on an issue as a means to prevent that candi-
date from considering that issue once he becomes an elected fed-
eral official.
Furthermore, qualified contributors can take solace in the fact
that, under the CARSON Act, elected federal officials would not
be prevented from acting on issues that are of general interest to
the public. For instance, if a qualified contributor has contributed
in excess of $1,000 to an elected federal official, and that qualified
contributor has a significant interest at stake in the appropria-
tions act, the elected federal official is nonetheless eligible to de-
bate and vote on that legislation.
The CARSON Act would improve the current federal system by
reforming campaign finance law from a non-traditional angle. By
restricting the actions of elected federal officials, and not the ac-
tions of contributors, the CARSON Act would provide a simpler
and more effective body of law that does not infringe on First
Amendment rights.
IX. THE CHALLENGES OF THE CARSON ACT
As with any proposed legislation or major reform, the CARSON
Act would be subject to valid criticism. Perfect legislation does not
exist in an area where governing is so difficult, and the CARSON
Act would certainly have vulnerabilities.
A. Issues of Interest
One of the greatest challenges to the practical application of
the CARSON Act is attempting to define the issues in which a
particular qualified contributor may have an interest. Obviously
the issues in which individual contributors have an interest are
irrelevant because elected federal officials are free to consider
those issues, regardless of the level at which those individuals
contribute.224 The Act would attempt to deal with the challenge of
224. The effect of the CARSON Act on individual contributors is discussed in Part
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defining the issues in which a qualified contributor has an inter-
est in several ways. First, the Act's disclosure requirements
would require all contributors that contribute in excess of $100 in
an election cycle to make a disclosure to the treasurer of that
campaign committee within ten days of making the contribution.
Qualified contributors are required to disclose, in addition to
other personal information:
the names, business addresses, and telephone numbers of all sub-
sidiaries of that qualified contributor along with a brief description
of the types of activities performed by that qualified contributor and
its subsidiaries; the name, business address, and telephone number
of any lobbyists for that qualified contributor along with an identifi-
cation of the subject matter about which the lobbyist(s) will engage
in lobbying; and the names, business addresses, and telephone num-
bers of any entity that is represented by that qualified contributor
along with a brief description of the type of business performed by
each of those entities.
The hope is that the disclosure would provide the elected federal
official with enough information to enlighten him about the is-
sues in which the qualified contributor has an interest. Once
enlightened, under the CARSON Act's directive of self-policing,
the elected federal official must determine whether he wants to
return the contribution or be disqualified from considering those
issues in which the qualified contributor is interested. Pursuant
to the charge of the Act, if the elected federal official is unable to
determine the issues in which the qualified contributor has an in-
terest, he may request an opinion from the FEC.
Furthermore, the breadth of the disclosure required by the Act
should help address the challenge of identifying the issues in
which a qualified contributor is interested. The body politic and
the media will have access to information detailing the names of
those that have contributed in excess of $100 to elected federal of-
ficials and the ultimate amount they have contributed. If an
elected federal official considers an issue in which a qualified con-
tributor has an interest, the informed public and the media would
serve to hold him accountable based on the information available
to them through full disclosure.
The Act would also attempt to address this challenge in its




cial from considering an issue in which a qualified contributor is
interested only if that issue is "substantially different" from an
issue in which the public has an interest. Under the Act, if an
elected federal official concludes that an issue in which a quali-
fied contributor has an interest is an issue of general public con-
cern, he could consider that issue. If the official is unclear
whether the issue is of general public concern, he could request
an opinion from the FEC. This would address the concern because
many groups that represent diverse interests would have inter-
ests in many issues, but those interests would also be of concern
to the general public.
For instance, the two major political parties would likely con-
tribute well in excess of the thresholds to candidates and elected
federal officials. These contributions would certainly deem the po-
litical parties qualified contributors. Most of the issues furthered
by the two major political parties, however, are issues of general
concern to the public. The parties would certainly pick a side on
most issues, zealously advocate for those positions, and no doubt
be heavily invested in furthering those positions, but many of the
issues would nonetheless be of general public concern.
The CARSON Act attempts to address one of its greatest chal-
lenges and most exploitable loopholes by employing a system of
full disclosure and by narrowly defining the issues in which a
qualified contributor can have an interest.
B. Individual Contributors
Under the CARSON Act, an individual would never be deemed
a qualified contributor. That is, an elected federal official may
consider any issue in which any individual has an interest re-
gardless of how much the individual has contributed to the
elected federal official. Entities, both public and private, legiti-
mately transfer large amounts of wealth to individuals in the
United States every day. These entities have a vested interest in
supporting elected federal officials who support their causes.
Those individuals who have been made wealthy by those entities
also have a vested interest in supporting elected federal officials
who support the causes of those entities.
Exempting individuals from the scope of the CARSON Act may
indeed hamper the reform that the Act pursues, but two major
rationales underlie the exemption.
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First, if individuals were not exempted, the CARSON Act
would infringe on their First Amendment rights. As stated
throughout this commentary, the CARSON Act avoids First
Amendment infringement by restricting what the elected federal
official can give the contributor, instead of restricting what the
(qualified or individual) contributor can give the elected federal
official. As also stated throughout this commentary, the CARSON
Act seeks to encourage contributors of all types to become more
involved in the political process by not placing limits on the
amount that may be contributed to elected federal officials.
Secondly, individuals are exempted under the CARSON Act be-
cause it is impossible to define the issues in which they have an
interest. The issues in which a contributing corporation, union, or
association has an interest are more readily definable than those
issues in which an individual has an interest. For instance, a
chief executive officer of a major pharmaceutical company, in his
individual capacity, may contribute at a high level to elected fed-
eral officials whose votes can affect the pharmaceutical industry;
issues that affect the pharmaceutical industry are certainly is-
sues in which the individual has an interest. However, that same
individual may also be interested in Second Amendment rights,
reproductive rights, and trade issues. Defining the issues in
which the individual has an interest, in order to prevent the
elected federal officials to whom he has contributed from consid-
ering those issues, is impossible, whereas defining the issues in
which the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of Amer-
ica has an interest, while certainly not an easy task, is more
achievable.
Even though an individual may contribute to an elected federal
official at any level without affecting that official's ability to con-
sider an issue, the CARSON Act still requires the full disclosure
of contributions made by that individual. The consolation under
the Act for exempting individual contributors is that the public
will still be armed with the information about to whom and at
what level the individual is contributing.
Furthermore, it seems that non-individuals are more to blame
for the actual and apparent corruption that currently exists in the




Many of the "deeply disturbing examples" of corruption cited by this
Court in Buckley to justify FECA's contribution limits were not epi-
sodes of vote buying, but evidence that various corporate interests
had given substantial donations to gain access to high-level govern-
ment officials. Even if that access did not secure actual influence, it
certainly gave the "appearance of such influence."
225
Additionally, in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, the
Supreme Court stated:
Regardless of whether [the] danger of "financial quid pro quo" cor-
ruption may be sufficient to justify a restriction on independent ex-
penditures, Michigan's regulation aims at a different type of corrup-
tion in the political arena: the corrosive and distorting effects of
immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help
of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the
public's support for the corporation's political ideas.
226
The Court has pointed more to non-individuals as the cause of ac-
tual and apparent corruption. Furthermore, Congress has tar-
geted non-individuals to a greater degree with its campaign fi-
nance legislation, presumably at the urging of the public or
because Congress feels that such targeting meets a public need.
The CARSON Act exempts individuals to avoid trespassing on
their First Amendment rights and because the issues in which
they have an interest are not readily definable. Additionally, the
Act focuses its reform on contributions made by non-individuals
because the Supreme Court, Congress, and the American public
seem to agree that non-individuals breed more actual or apparent
corruption in the context of campaign finance than individuals.
C. First Amendment Infringement
It would be difficult, if not politically impracticable, for an
elected federal official to argue that the CARSON Act would in-
fringe on his First Amendment rights. Such an argument would
essentially require an elected federal official to claim that the
First Amendment guarantees him the right to consider issues in
which a contributor has an interest. It seems unlikely that the
Supreme Court would find such a relationship to qualify as "po-
litical association," and it also appears unlikely that any politi-
225. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 150 (2003) (citations omitted).
226. 494 U.S. 652, 659-60 (1990).
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cian would make such an argument. If an elected federal official
were to pose such a stance, it seems certain that a savvy oppo-
nent in the next election cycle could claim that the official be-
lieves he has a First Amendment right to grant political paybacks
to his contributors.
In Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, a political party and
a judicial candidate sued Minnesota state actors over the consti-
tutionality of a Minnesota state law that prohibited judicial can-
didates from announcing their views on certain controversial or
legally disputed issues during a campaign.227 The state actors
proffered two compelling state interests in an attempt to justify
the restriction: preserving both the actual impartiality of the
state judiciary and "the appearance of impartiality of the state
judiciary."22 The Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny in over-
turning the Eighth Circuit and holding that the restriction was
not narrowly tailored to achieve impartiality.229 The Court also
found the restriction to be underinclusive because it permitted
judicial candidates to make statements and announcements at
certain times while prohibiting those same statements and an-
nouncements at other times. 230
The Supreme Court in Republican Party of Minnesota estab-
lished a First Amendment right for political candidates of all
types to speak on behalf of themselves during a political cam-
paign. Presumably, during the campaign season, a candidate is
speaking on behalf of himself and not his (potential) constituents.
No indication is given by the Court in Republican Party of Minne-
sota that it would go a step further to strike down a restriction
limiting the ability of a public official, once elected, to speak, act,
or vote on behalf of his constituents, i.e., someone other than
himself. Conversely, the Supreme Court in Republican Party of
Minnesota stated: "'It is simply not the function of government to
select which issues are worth discussing or debating in the course
of a political campaign.'231
In another somewhat related Supreme Court case, Wood v.
Georgia, an elected sheriff challenged a Georgia Court of Appeals
227. 536 U.S. 765, 768, 770 (2002).
228. Id. at 775.
229. See id. at 788.
230. Id. at 779-80.
231. Id. at 782 (quoting Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 60 (1982)) (emphasis added).
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decision affirming his conviction for contempt of court.232 The
sheriff had issued two press releases and submitted a letter to the
grand jury criticizing a judge's actions and criticizing the charges
brought against candidates for public office who had allegedly
paid money to black leaders in exchange for votes from black citi-
zens. 233 The sheriffs contempt conviction was upheld by the Geor-
gia Court of Appeals because the statements posed a clear and
present danger to the court and grand jury proceedings.234
The Supreme Court overturned the conviction, held that the
contempt charge was not justified, and found that the evidence
could not establish that the sheriffs communications actually dis-
turbed the grand jury's proceedings. 23" The Court held that the
contempt charges violated the sheriffs right to free speech be-
cause the evidence could not show that his speech created a clear
and present danger.236 Chief Justice Warren, writing for himself
and four other Justices, wrote:
The petitioner was an elected official and had the right to enter the
field of political controversy, particularly where his political life was
at stake. The role that elected officials play in our society makes it
all the more imperative that they be allowed freely to express them-
selves on matters of current public importance.
237
Under the CARSON Act, in compliance with Wood, elected fed-
eral officials would be empowered to "express themselves on mat-
ters of current public importance."238 Unlike the local court in
Wood, the CARSON Act would not proscribe the speech of elected
federal officials, but instead disqualify them from considering is-
sues in which a qualified contributor has an interest-and that
interest must be substantially different from an interest of gen-
eral public concern.
In addressing another First Amendment concern-limitations
on contributions-the Act would not restrict the amount that a
qualified contributor may contribute to a candidate. Therefore, to
make a First Amendment argument against the Act, a qualified
232. 370 U.S. 375, 376 (1962).
233. See id. at 376, 379-80.
234. Id. at 389.
235. Id. at 395.
236. Id. at 394.
237. Id. at 394-95 (citation omitted).
238. See id. at 395.
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contributor likely would have to argue that it has a First
Amendment right to have elected federal officials vote on issues
in which it has an interest. It seems unlikely that a federal court
would agree with such a position.
Furthermore, qualified contributors are non-individuals who
usually do not have the same constitutional relationship to
elected federal officials as individuals. That is, an individual con-
tributor is a citizen of one state and is represented by one Repre-
sentative, two Senators, one President, and one Vice President. It
is conceivable that the individual contributor has a constitutional
right to representation by those who directly represent him in the
political process. This is one basis for the CARSON Act permit-
ting elected federal officials to consider issues in which individual
contributors have an interest regardless of the size of their con-
tributions. On the other hand, a qualified contributor may not be
the resident of a single state; it may be a corporation doing regu-
lar business in every state and having multiple principal places of
business. It seems that the qualified contributor in this example
would have a difficult time arguing that it has a First Amend-
ment right to be represented by all the elected federal officials
who represent all of the areas in which the qualified contributor
is a resident, regularly does business, or has a principal place of
business.
D. Influence of Contributions
Elected federal officials may argue that they should retain
their ability to consider issues in which a qualified contributor
has an interest because they are not influenced by contributions.
This argument against the Act is porous. First, contributions
must influence elected federal officials; otherwise, contributing at
a high level would be futile for the contributor. It is difficult to be-
lieve that large private sector companies, known for their fiscal
prudence, would make large contributions if they believed such
contributions would have no impact on elected federal officials.
Whether contributions are innocently made by contributors to
further their own political beliefs, or are made to gain access to
an elected federal official, contributions do influence their recipi-
ents.
Secondly, the comments made by Senator Mitch McConnell on
the floor of the Senate arguing against the passage of BCRA,
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when contrasted with the events that have occurred in Washing-
ton since the passage of BCRA, provide a real example of this ar-
gument's lack of merit. On March 20, 2002, Senator McConnell
stated:
Although the facts about the provisions of this bill are almost always
misrepresented, the driving mantra behind the entire movement is
that we are all corrupt or that we appear to be corrupt. We have ex-
plored corruption and the appearance of [corruption] before in this
Chamber. You cannot have corruption unless someone is corrupt. At
no time has any Member of either body offered evidence of even the
slightest hint of corruption by any Member of either body. As for the
appearance of corruption, our friends in the media who are part and
parcel of the reform industry continue to make broad and baseless
accusations. 239
On March 29, 2006, Jack Abramoff was sentenced to five years
and ten months in prison after pleading guilty to fraud, tax eva-
sion, and conspiracy to bribe public officials.24 ° As stated above,
Representative Robert Ney and other members of Congress have
been caught up in Abramoff's circle of corruption.24' This chain of
events illustrates that contributions do influence public officials,
that corruption is often grounded in campaign contributions, that
corruption does exist in spite of current laws that seek to curb it,
and that reform is needed.
Finally, it seems politically impracticable for a federal candi-
date or an elected federal official to argue against the Act because
he wishes to retain the ability to consider issues in which a quali-
fied contributor has an interest. Such an argument seems to be
one for perpetuating the quid pro quo, monetary influence, and
distortion that is currently associated with the financing of fed-
eral campaigns. Furthermore, because a vote against the Act
could be interpreted as a vote for the continuation of the actual
and apparent corruption that currently exists in campaign fi-
nance, it seems that such an interpretation could easily be ex-
ploited by a political opponent in a subsequent election cycle.
239. 148 CONG. REC. 52096, 2119 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2002) (statement of Sen. McCon-
nell).
240. See supra note 26.
241. See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
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E. The Threshold Level
The argument could be made that the CARSON Act would be
too restrictive, and that the contribution thresholds which pre-
vent an elected federal official from considering an issue in which
a qualified contributor has an interest would be too low for both
congressional and presidential candidates. The height of the
threshold is always a debatable point as there is no correct place
to draw the line, and certain factions involved in the debate will
always argue that the threshold is either too high or too low-few
will contend that its placement is just right.
As with many of the other arguments against the Act, it would
be difficult for an elected federal official to publicly argue that the
thresholds have been set too low. Under the Act, because an
elected federal official retains the ability to solicit and accept con-
tributions of any amount, it seems an argument against the se-
verity of the thresholds is really an argument for greater flexibil-
ity to grant political paybacks to qualified contributors.
The Supreme Court addressed thresholds as recently as 2006
in Randall v. Sorrell, when it held that Vermont state limits on
contributions and expenditures violated the First Amendment.242
The Vermont campaign finance statute employed a two-year elec-
tion cycle and applied restrictions based on the office sought by
the candidate.243 The restrictions governed the amount that can-
didates for state office could spend on their own elections and the
amount that a contributor could contribute to a candidate.244 The
Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit's upholding of the
Vermont law, and while the Court could not agree on an opinion,
six Justices held that the expenditure limits placed on candidates
for state office, and the contribution limits placed on individuals,
organizations, and political parties, were unconstitutionally of-
fensive to the First Amendment.24 5
The Court held that Vermont's restrictions on a candidate's ex-
penditures, and the justifications for it, were similar to the ex-
penditure restrictions and justifications in FECA that were
242. 126 S. Ct. 2479, 2485 (2006).
243. Id. at 2486.
244. Id. at 2486-87.
245. Id. at 2500.
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struck down on First Amendment grounds in Buckley.246 The
Court found that the Vermont limits were substantially lower
than the contribution limits it had previously upheld and were
comparatively more restrictive than the limits imposed by other
states.247 The Court ultimately held that the Vermont law was
not closely drawn to meet its objectives because every player in
the political process was somehow inhibited by its restrictions.248
Consequently, the Court held that Vermont's limits on contribu-
tions were unconstitutional because they burdened First Amend-
ment interests in a manner disproportionate to the public pur-
poses that the limits were codified to advance.249
The CARSON Act would not run afoul of the Court's holding in
Randall because it places no express limits on contributions from
any source and in no way limits expenditures. The CARSON Act
would employ thresholds for disclosure and for disqualifying
elected federal officials from considering issues in which a quali-
fied contributor has an interest. However, the CARSON Act
thresholds would not restrict political participation in the same
manner, or to the same degree, as the Vermont limits that the
Court deemed unconstitutional in Randall.
F. Representation by Elected Officials
Elected federal officials may argue that they should retain the
ability to represent like-minded constituents even if those con-
stituents have contributed more than $1,000 or $10,000. The offi-
cials could claim that they were elected because they hold certain
beliefs shared by their constituents, that those constituents
should be empowered to contribute to candidates or elected fed-
eral officials who share their beliefs, and that the elected federal
officials who benefit from those contributions should be allowed to
continue representing those interests. This argument would
likely define "constituents" broadly to include those who reside in
the elected federal official's home district as well as those willing
to contribute to his campaign based on a shared political philoso-
phy.
246. Id. at 2490-91.
247. Id. at 2494.
248. Id. at 2499-2500.
249. Id. at 2500.
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The counter-argument to this claim is that the elected federal
official has a duty to be responsive to his constituents regardless
of how much, if any, the constituents contribute to his campaign.
Most officials are elected because they share a political philoso-
phy with a majority of the voters in their district, or at least they
share more in common with the voters than their opponent.
Therefore, it seems that the elected federal official would repre-
sent this same philosophy regardless of contributions.
Additionally, as set out above, the CARSON Act permits an
elected federal official to consider issues in which a qualified con-
tributor has an interest, if that interest is not "substantially dif-
ferent" from an interest of the general public. This portion of the
Act would allow elected federal officials to consider issues of gen-
eral interest that broadly affect their constituents, even if a par-
ticular constituent has contributed in excess of $1,000 or $10,000
to a campaign in a single election cycle.
G. Effect on Incumbents
Incumbents and those in positions of leadership could argue
that the CARSON Act would disproportionately affect their abil-
ity to solicit contributions and consider issues. An incumbent
could argue that while the Act would severely restrain his ability
to garner contributions from his larger base of contributors, a
challenger with little initial support is largely unaffected by the
Act because he would likely generate few large contributions. An
incumbent, however, should not be able to cash in on his good
will-merely because he serves in a leadership role, or because he
has served one or more terms, does not entitle the incumbent to
receive larger contributions with greater frequency. Thus, an in-
cumbent would have a difficult time making the argument that
he has a greater interest in receiving large contributions than
does a challenger and that such interest deserves protection.
An incumbent also could argue that even if the challenger,
whose chances of victory appear unlikely at the outset, were to
generate large contributions, the challenger could more readily
accept those contributions than could an incumbent. That is, the
incumbent must be more cautious in accepting larger contribu-
tions to avoid disqualifying himself from considering issues in
which qualified contributors have an interest, if re-elected. Again,
it seems that an incumbent would be slow to admit that he makes
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strategic decisions about which contributions to accept based on
his desire to avoid disqualifying himself from considering issues
in which a qualified contributor has an interest.
H. Potential Inaction
Opponents of the CARSON Act could argue that the Act would
frequently create a situation where an issue comes before Con-
gress, but because of the broad and generous contributions given
by a contributor who has an interest in the issue, less than a quo-
rum of the Congress would be able to consider the issue. Similar
to GACIA, the CARSON Act allows an elected federal official to
consider issues in which a qualified contributor has an interest if
that interest is not "substantially different" from an interest of
the general public.250 This portion of the CARSON Act would en-
sure that all members of Congress could consider issues that have
an impact on the general public.
If the CARSON Act, however, does create a situation where
less than a quorum of Congress is able to consider an issue in
which a common qualified contributor has an interest, but in
which the general public does not have an interest, then the Act
would be accomplishing its purpose. If effective, the Act would
place the onus on qualified contributors and elected federal offi-
cials to ensure that this situation does not occur.
As with any proposed legislation, especially when proposed to
govern something as elusive as campaign finance, there are valid
arguments against the CARSON Act. For each conceived valid
argument against the Act, however, there is a valid counter-
argument, and its inherent benefits would far outweigh its short-
comings.
X. THE MOST FORESEEABLE LOOPHOLES OF THE CARSON ACT
In its aim to reform current campaign finance laws, the
CARSON Act would attempt to close potential loopholes that
could be exploited by qualified contributors, candidates, and
elected federal officials to negate the effectiveness of the Act. Un-
fortunately, the effectiveness of campaign finance laws will al-
250. Cf. VA. CODE ANN. § 30-101 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
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ways be subject to loopholes because it is impossible to account
for all types of contribution transactions, all types of contribution
schemes, and the creativity and perseverance which contributors,
candidates, and elected officials will employ in an attempt to cir-
cumvent the laws.
One loophole with which the CARSON Act would attempt to
deal exists where would-be contributors make uncoordinated ex-
penditures on behalf of candidates to avoid making a contribution
that would bar a candidate, once elected, from considering issues
in which that would-be contributor has an interest. The CARSON
Act, of course, would treat coordinated expenditures made on be-
half of a candidate as contributions. The CARSON Act, however,
would not ban or restrict supporters from making uncoordinated
expenditures on behalf of candidates primarily because such bans
and restrictions are constitutionally suspect.2"1 However, the
CARSON Act, in its spirit of full disclosure, would require that
any expenditure made on behalf of a candidate in excess of $100
be reported to the FEC. This requirement would not infringe on
First Amendment rights because it would not limit the amount
that can be spent on behalf of a candidate, but would merely re-
quire full disclosure of such expenditures.
Another potential loophole concerns entities that engage a
third party to contribute money on their behalf so the candidate,
once elected, can retain his ability to consider issues in which the
source of the contribution has an interest. The CARSON Act
would deal directly with this potential loophole in two ways.
First, individuals would be barred from contributing or making
expenditures on behalf of anyone but themselves. Second, the
Act's disclosure and disqualification requirements would work to-
gether to close this loophole. That is, if an individual or qualified
contributor contributes in excess of $100 to a candidate or to an
ultimate qualified contributor, the contributor and recipient both
have to disclose that contribution.
Additionally, if a qualified contributor contributes in excess of
$1,000 or $10,000 to an (ultimate) elected federal official or to a
qualified contributor that ultimately contributes or makes an ex-
penditure in excess of $1,000 or $10,000 to an (ultimate) elected
federal official, the elected federal official would be disqualified
251. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 58-59 (1976).
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from considering an issue in which either the (source) qualified
contributor or the ultimate contributing qualified contributor has
an interest. In this way, the Act would bar individuals from chan-
neling, funneling, or laundering money to elected federal officials,
and the Act would employ disclosure requirements to ensure that
an original contribution made by a non-individual, which finds its
way to an elected federal official, disqualifies the elected federal
official from considering an issue in which the original qualified
contributor has an interest.
The CARSON Act would attempt to address another loophole
through its reliance on full disclosure. Under the Act, qualified
contributors may make contributions to other qualified contribu-
tors that support issues in which the general public has an inter-
est. In turn, the qualified contributor that received the contribu-
tion can make contributions to, or make uncoordinated
expenditures on behalf of, candidates so as to allow those candi-
dates, once elected, to retain their ability to consider issues in
which that original contributor has an interest. First, all contri-
butions or expenditures in excess of $100 must be disclosed. Sec-
ond, if the qualified contributor that ultimately contributes to, or
makes an uncoordinated expenditure on behalf of, the candidate
does support issues of general interest, then the original contri-
bution made to it by a qualified contributor with a special interest
would be blended with contributions made by contributors that
support general interests. That is, when a special interest at-
tempts to funnel its contribution through a qualified contributor
that supports general interests, the intensity of that contribu-
tion's influence is lessened.
The CARSON Act would attempt to anticipate and deal with
the most glaring potential loopholes, but in doing so, the language
of the Act would inevitably leave gaps that could be exploited by
creative contributors, candidates, and elected federal officials.
XI. CONCLUSION
The CARSON Act has been developed and explored in the con-
fines of Virginia campaign finance law. However, the Act would
provide an alternative to federal campaign finance law that is
less complicated, is more effective at curbing actual and apparent
corruption, and does not infringe on the rights of free speech and
2007]
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political association guaranteed by the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution.
The CARSON Act would deal directly with the three most fatal
flaws in the current body of federal campaign finance law. In ad-
dition, the Act could have a chilling effect on the amount contrib-
uted in federal elections even though it neither entertains such a
goal nor employs express contribution limits that would infringe
on First Amendment rights. If the CARSON Act does have this
chilling effect, because qualified contributors may contribute less
to allow an elected federal official to retain his ability to consider
issues in which they have an interest, it would change the entire
landscape in which individuals seek public office in the United
States. Campaigns would cost less, which should encourage more
people to seek office; candidates would have to be more thoughtful
when determining how to disperse their messages with less re-
sources; presumably more candidates would be elected based on
the strength of their message as opposed to the size of their cam-
paign fund; and ideas could be assessed on their own merit with-
out regard to the size of their supporter's contribution.
At the same time, the Act would empower candidates to solicit,
and contributors to make, contributions above the current federal
limits. This enabling spirit of the Act could instead increase the
amount contributed in federal elections. The lack of contribution
limits under the Act would encourage more political participation,
by way of contributions and expenditures, from both individuals
and qualified contributors. Furthermore, having this ability to so-
licit larger contributions could enable candidates and elected fed-
eral officials to spend less time soliciting contributions and more
time doing the work of those who elected them. The full disclo-
sure and disqualification requirements of the Act, however, will
nonetheless curb corruption even if contributions do increase un-
der the Act.
Like any campaign finance law, the CARSON Act is not free of
flaws. However, its text and spirit would provide many sound
counter-arguments to the most valid criticism that can be made
against it. Furthermore, while no campaign finance law can be
immune from loopholes, the CARSON Act would address those
exploitable gaps that are the most conceivable and foreseeable.
The CARSON Act would effectively deal with the three most
fatal flaws of current federal campaign finance law-complexity,
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ineffectiveness, and First Amendment infringement-while going
further to improve the system. The Act would also offer effective
answers to its critics and would attempt to close exploitable loop-
holes. The CARSON Act would provide a sound alternative to the
current federal campaign finance system, not by preventing a
contributor from giving to a politician, but by preventing a politi-
cian from giving to a contributor.

